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Abstract
Despite the rising development and popularity of HPC systems, there have been
insufficient advancements towards the security of HPC systems. The substantial com-
putational power, high bandwidth networks, and massive storage capacity provided
in the HPC environment are desirable targets for the attackers.
The majority of educational institution HPC centres provide their users with simple
access methods lacking the modern security needs. Thus, accelerating the systems’
proneness to modern cyber-attacks. The current implementations of HPC access
points, such as web portals, offer users direct access to the HPC systems. Conse-
quently, such web portal implementations affect the HPC system with the same
security challenges faced by cloud providers and web applications. Although attempts
have been made toward securing HPC systems, most of these implementations are
outdated, insufficient with the current security standards, or do not integrate well
with modern HPC access solutions.
To address these security issues, Bearicade, a novel High-Performance Computing
(HPC) user and security management system, was designed, developed, implemented
and evaluated. Bearicade is a data-driven secure unified framework for managing
HPC users and systems security. This framework is an add-on layer to an existing
HPC systems software, collecting over 50 different types of information from multiple
sources within the HPC systems. It offers Artificial Intelligent security solutions with
an added usability and accessibility without adversely affecting the performance and
functionality of HPC systems. Throughout this study, the security and usability of
Bearicade were validated implementing multiple Machine Learning models. It has
been deployed over three years as a production system for students and researchers
at the University of Huddersfield QueensGate Grid (QGG) with considerable success,
protecting the QGG systems from the summer 2020 attacks that has affected many
other HPC systems in research and educational establishments.
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Jody et al., 2020)
This conference paper was presented at The 19th IEEE International Conference on Trust,
Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications. Some information presented in
this conference paper was included in this thesis. Such minor thoughts were paraphrased
and structured throughout Chapters 3 and 5. I would like to confirm that I was the main
author of this conference paper.
Security Orchestration, Automation and Response (SOAR) in HPC (Al-Jody and
Holmes, 2019)
This topic was presented as a poster at the Emerging Technology Conference 2019. I would
like to confirm that there was no particular information used in this thesis “adopted from




Supercomputers are also known as High-performance Computing (HPC), a term given to
an extremely powerful computer set. HPC is one of the leading technologies in aerospace,
automotive, finance, military and sciences fields. It is a necessity for research and focuses
mainly on improving computing performance through parallel algorithms, computer architec-
ture and software development. In academia and industry, clusters and grids are the two
dominant ways in deploying High-Performance computing.(Pellerin David et al., 2015)
User management systems for HPC is often an afterthought of current administrative practises
that fail to provide modern security measures for HPC systems. In the research and education
communities, there are no general HPC protection standards. Each organisation has its
own policy, which is often validated by certification authority (CA). Because the HPC
systems are often behind institutional firewalls, most registered users use Simply Secure
Shell (SSH) (Daniel J. Barrett, Richard E. Silverman, 2005) to access given HPC resource.
The institutions often hold training events to educate the users on how to access their HPC
resources; this is sometimes perceived as a barrier to entry to HPC. However, the client-side
software used to access HPC systems are generally insecure or being operated in an insecure
environments, such as Putty (Meister, 2007). Usually, several HPC centres (Vacca, 2004) use
Private Key Infrastructure (PKI) as their primary authentication method. This approach
2 Introduction
has been shown to be reliable. However, even with PKI authentication in place, users with a
low level of security knowledge can face security issues.
Most attacks have a life cycle of development. Every step of its development may result in
indicators that may be hard for security professionals and system administrators to notice.
Hence SIEM systems development was required. SIEM systems provide visualisation of data.
Also, they facilitate the collection of data and events in most system components, giving
system administrators a massive amount of data that they are able to analyse. Due to the
improvements of SIEM systems, security administrators are being swamped with data, which
in most cases might be noise, making attackers mission simpler.
The integration of artificial intelligence tools with security systems like SIEM might help
with this issue and become the systems administrator’s right-hand.
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) could be used to analyse the data from collectors, then
perform data classification, identify patterns, and detect anomalies.
1.1 HPC Security
Cyber Security becomes a significant necessity in every scheme to be enforced. Security
requirements are a crucial topic for high-performance security systems, and more emphasis
should be placed on them.
High-performance computing has received incredible hardware and software development
and enhancement. It also faces a rise in the amount of research, industrial or other business
uses. In addition, the security aspect and user communication and authentication are not
sufficiently developed (Dewayne Adams, 2011).
According to Dewayne Adams, the Chief Technology Officer at Patriot Technologies, high-
performance computing safety varies from standard enterprise-level safety.
From the workshop “Cybersecurity for HPC Systems: Challenges and Opportunities” by
Sean Peisert in the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the threats of High-
Performance Computing Systems could be divided into three sections CIA (Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability) (Peisert-Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, 2016).
1.2 Motivation 3
Confidentiality is the vitality and the sensitivity of the data. Integrity focuses on the
authenticity of the code and the adequate usage of computational power. Finally, availability
concentrates on potentials of attack that might affect the availability of the services, such as
Denial of service attacks and overflow attacks.
1.2 Motivation
In the past, security breaches targeting HPC systems tended to be few and far between.
Nowadays, HPC systems are facing an increase in vulnerabilities and attacks. Vulnerabilities
and weak security implementations may lead to attacks such as phishing, malware, account
takeover, data breach, brute-force and many more. In addition, the rewards for attacking
such systems are becoming more valuable. Thus, improving the security of HPC systems is a
necessity (Kesteren, 2019).
At the University of Huddersfield, there is a range of HPC Systems only protected by custom
firewall rules set by the University. There have been various attacks targeting numerous
systems at the University of Huddersfield. Specially Queens Gate Grid Systems and High-
Performance Computing Research group with attack attempts reaching up to 50,000 attacks
per day.
Moreover, a malicious group attacked university data centres in summer 2020 for CPU
cryptocurrency mining. The group was able to gain access to various HPC grids by hopping
between infected SSH accounts. This cyber-attack has impacted several HPC centres in the
United Kingdom, resulting in prolonged downtime in some cases.
Based on the recent meeting of the HPC-SIG Group, which consisted of representatives from
the UK’s High-Performance Computing Community, there is no universally accepted security
framework. The current existing solutions of a security framework for High-Performance
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Computing are private unreleased institutional solutions. The university members of the
HPC-SIG plan to address the issues raised above.
1.3 Aims and Objectives
The overall purpose of this project is to create a novel, data-driven and secure framework for
user and security management enabling autonomous anomaly detection through Machine
Learning technologies with the application in High-Performance Computing (HPC) Systems.
In order to satisfy this aim, the following objectives are addressed:
• Investigate current SIEM and SOAR frameworks designed for usage in HPC systems.
• Explore Artificial intelligent algorithms designed for anomaly detection in access and
usage of HPC systems.
• Find out AI tools and integrations with SOAR systems.
• Devise new novel secure framework specifically for HPC.
• Deploy the framework in the University of Huddersfield Campus Grid for management
of HPC resources and users.
• Allow the University of Huddersfield Campus Grid users to use the framework as the
main gateway for the HPC resources.
• Collect different types of data from various sources within the framework related to
system security.
• Enhance the security of the novel framework using Artificial Intelligence tools.
• Evaluate the effectiveness of the deployed solution, using the system and users’ data,
as reliable and secure framework for accessing and utilising the HPC systems.
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1.4 Methodology
Methodologies impose a disciplined approach on software development in order to make it
more predictable and efficient. The guidelines from the literature will serve as a way to verify
that the developed solution leads to the achievement of the research goal. Examples of these
guidelines are (i) the definitions of characteristics presented by existing implementations
(ii) the functional and non-functional requirement for an HPC portal (iii) the security
standards and implementations for web applications and servers.
1.4.1 Software Design Models
To build software products, a planned and systematic procedure should be used. Developing
and maintaining the code required to build software is referred to as "software development"
(McCormick, 2012). The process of software development may include ideas based on the
requirement analysis, an essential design of the software, or a change in requirement through
to the final stages of the development of the software. Thus, a flexible and dynamic software
design model has to be adopted for this purpose. Some of the software development models
commonly used are Waterfall, Spiral, UML and Agile models.
Waterfall
The waterfall model is one of the traditional software design models that define the process
for software development into a specific sequence. However many issues have been identified
in the waterfall model, commonly acknowledged issues include dealing with change and
the fact that flaws are sometimes identified too late in the software development process
(Petersen et al., 2009).
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Agile
Agile is one of the most recent models to be introduced as a software development methodology,
it allows for smaller components of the software to be developed first allowing for the ability
to acknowledge changes throughout the process of the development which is happening at
regular intervals (McCormick, 2012).
Prototyping
Prototyping methodology requires building a prototype of the software with the essential
functionalities included. The prototype is developed further as feedbacks are received. This
methodology is appropriate for large projects especially when the requirements are difficult
to define or when the project is unique and there are no examples exist (Despa, 2014).
1.4.2 Adopted Software Design Model
To better justify the adopted software design model, a brief overview of the steps carried in
this research is outlined as such:
1. An extensive literature review will be carried over the current published work around the
access methods and the security around the High-Performance Computing environment.
The current existing HPC security methods will be investigated, demonstrating the
gaps in security for HPC systems.
2. A unified experimental system will be designed as a test-bed to collect data from HPC
systems and users in order to analyse and understand such data and further build the
system to be capable of identifying security issues.
3. Experiments will then be conducted to evaluate the experimental system capability in
identifying security issues and the capability of allowing further research to be carried
in order to advance the security of the unified system contentiously.
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4. As part of the experiments, novel security platforms and AI tools will be designed,
developed and evaluated using the data gathered over four years.
5. The system will also be evaluated using the University of Huddersfield QueensGate










Fig. 1.1 Agile approach for Bearicade’s Development
Considering the known stages of the software design models and the overview of the planned
steps to be carried in this research, Agile methodology is more suitable than the others
for developing Bearicade. As shown in figure 1.1, Bearicade will involve researching and
information gathering for what components should be included in Bearicade and their
functionality. Following the research design requirements will be devised in order to work
on the development of Bearicade. After the development phase, Bearicade will be tested
then deployed on the main QueensGate Grid gateway. The feedback will be sought after the
deployment through the users’ feedback and technical logs on Bearicade.
The Agile methodology is done over several cycles meaning that the phase will be repeated
multiple times to ensure such a large project is completed on time with the required
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functionality. A more in-depth procedure of the deployment process is explained in chapter
Deployment of Bearicade.
1.4.3 Research Methods
Research Methods are a systematic and organised approach to data gathering and analysis
in order to extract information (Jankowicz, 2000). Developing Bearicade will be closely tied
with Data Science, Mathematics and Information Systems. Therefore, different components
of Bearicade could be evaluated through measurements or proofs. Consequently, In order
to evaluate the claims and functionality of Bearicade as a framework, a mixed empirical
research methods approach has been chosen for this purpose.
Surveys Will be conducted before the deployment of Bearicade and after in order to measure
the usability of Bearicade compared to the predecessor access software. In addition, Bearicade
users in the classroom will be observed in order to measure the effectiveness of Bearicade and
modify the requirements. Finally, data gathered through Bearicade will be visualized and
screened then use-cases will involve building Machine learning models in order to evaluate
their own accuracy and Bearicade’s functionality.
1.5 Summary
In this chapter the motivation, aims and objectives of this research and research methodology
were defined. The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 Literature Review,
Chapter 3 Bearicade, Chapter 4 Deployment of Bearicade, Chapter 5 Artificial intelligence-
based tools for secure access to HPC resources and Chapter 6 Conclusion and future work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this Chapter, there will be a complete list comparing HPC access solutions describing the
requirement and different implementations. The section will explore the security issues and
solutions within the different implementations of HPC and distributed systems along with
Artificial intelligence solutions.
2.1 Access to HPC Systems
Throughout this section different technologies were investigated for the secure access to and
utilisation of the HPC systems. Since HPC systems receive a considerable interest from
attackers trying to get access to HPC cluster due to the high computational power that
HPC systems offer for its users. Therefore, robust and secure access mechanism has to be
implemented in such systems.
Many of the UK’s HPC Centres, especially ones in educational institutions, use Secure Shell
(SSH) as a standard for accessing HPC systems. The usability of HPC systems is considered
to be another limitation to most HPC users.
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2.1.1 Secure Shell (SSH)
Secure Shell (SSH) is one of the most widely used protocols for protecting network communi-
cations. Since this approach is known for its vigorous history since 1995.
As most HPC centres use SSH as a primary way to interact with the system via a terminal,
requiring a basic knowledge of Bash Unix shell and command language (Newham, 2005) to
get started with interacting with the system. Bash typically run in a window (terminal) that
make use of character encoding methods such as American Standard Code for Information
Interchange (ASCII) Unicode Transformation Format (UTF) in order to render text (Kuhn,
2005). Users then read the text and execute commands, and these commands are prone to
syntax errors. A graphical user interface solution would improve the ease of use.
SSH consists of two elements server and client, and the whole point of SSH is to encrypt the
communication of packets over the server and client. Authentication is one of the client and
server’s main features, and SSH could be configured to authenticate users via passwords or
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI); this will be explored later in this section.
SSH is based on top of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), meaning that it uses TCP/IP
as its transport mechanism. This gives the protocol a varied range of opportunities and
challenges.
The server component defaulted to run on TCP port 22, allows clients to access the server
remotely rather than being fixed to a local network. On the other hand, this opens up the
opportunity for attackers to target servers with several attacks, especially the server will
be vulnerable to all attack vectors TCP is facing (Daniel J. Barrett, Richard E. Silverman,
2005).
As a solution for HPC users to access their systems, it is considered relatively lightweight for
the system, does not require a demanding setup process, and has little latency and bandwidth
issues. However, the users are still required to be knowledgeable in shell command language
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depending on the system. Also, the users have full responsibility for not sharing their private
key and/or their password with unauthorised individuals.
Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP)
Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) is usually used to complement Secure Shell (SSH)
functionality by allowing HPC users to access files on the remote HPC storage nodes and
easily transfer file between the user’s local machine and the main HPC storage nodes (Kruegel,
2004). The functionality of SFTP is similar to Secure File Copy (SCP).
2.1.2 Virtual Network Computing (VNC)
Like SSH, Virtual Network Computing is considered as an HPC access software; it allows
users to control the HPC gateway through a graphical user interface (GUI) (Richardson
et al., 1998). VNC has a significant effect on the gateway’s latency and bandwidth as a result
of the GUI capability.
VNC could also be setup to communicate over Transport Layer Security (TLS), hence all
communication will be encrypted. To authenticate users, a username and password would
be required from the user, and these credentials are typically the same as the system’s
credentials.
2.1.3 HPC Access Portal
Many web HPC systems portals have been created since the 1990s, when Java Applets became
common for full-stack creation, to make it easier for users to access HPC systems remotely.
Using a web HPC dashboard is considered the best way of making use of HPC resources
(Calegari et al., 2019). Upcoming section HPC Portal Solutions, will show the current
implementations of HPC Portal Solutions available. The next section will provide detailed
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information about these portals’ requirements and analysis of the security vulnerabilities in
some of the popular HPC portal solutions.
2.2 HPC Portal Requirements
This section will outline the requirements that qualify a software to be a suitable HPC
management system. This section will divide and consider the requirements to two sections,
Functional and Non-functional requirements.
2.2.1 Functional Requirements
Functional Requirements are the functions that could be included in the software to operate
an HPC system. Even though Functional requirements are mandatory, this section will
include some of the non-mandatory functions that have been implemented in many HPC
Portals. A 2019 paper on Web portals for High-Performance Computing summarizes two
functional requirements to be mandatory for a High-Performance Computing Web Portals
(Calegari et al., 2019).
Job Management
This is the core functionality of an HPC system: managing the jobs and the applications
executed. This functionality should be able to perform multiple core functions such as submit,
monitor, start, stop and pause (Calegari et al., 2019).
Data Management
This functionality complements the Job Management function by enabling HPC centres data
to be remotely managed by end-users. “So one of the main challenges for HPC as a Service
(HPCaaS) is to make remote data management as flexible as if it were local” (Calegari et al.,
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2019). The following functions should be considered in the making of this requirement:
“”upload and download files, preview file content, copy, move, rename, delete files, compress
and uncompress archive files, browse user data spaces (restricted to users’ privileges), manage
file ACLs (Access Control List), monitor quota(s)“” (Calegari et al., 2019).
2.2.2 Non-Functional Requirements
Non-Functional Requirements are the specification of software to judge the operation of such
system for HPC users; these requirements are judged by the software’s usability and efficiency.
The following section is an example of the requirements that must be up to standards.
Security
Security is a must for all forms of applications, but it’s particularly important when it’s
hosting sensitive data, research & development data, or nodes with a lot of processing
capacity. More about this feature (see Section Security Solutions for HPC and Distributed
Systems).
Usability
Usability is an important indicator of how interactive a system is. Several papers (Calegari
et al., 2019; Greenberg et al., 2005; Köhler et al., 2013; Sadowski and Shewmaker, 2010)
stressing over the importance of usability, from the usability of developing a Parallel program
to the ease of use when submitting a job to a cluster. As for an HPC portal as a whole, the
system should have the following elements of usability along with a description of how the
element could be measured or/and designed:
• Operability: HPC Portal should be a convenient and straightforward to use. With all
of the functionalities are designed in a way that is easy to be found and executed with
the least number of steps from the user.
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• Learnability: HPC Portal should be used without any further preparation or knowledge.
The various types of users can all follow the same basic portal workflow.
• Accessibility: Accessibility should be a fundamental requirement instead of an element
of usability; however for HPC portals will be kept as part of the usability. HPC Portal
should be available and simple to use for all users meaning that a number of essential
design keys should be enforced, e.g. (colour contrast, disability)
• Design: HPC Portals is considered to be the brand image of the provider, e.g. (Cloud
Provider, HPCaaS). Therefore, the portal should have an attractive design to reflect
the provider’s image and impress the users.
Performance
HPC systems are made to be fast in execution, meaning that performance is vital in every
scenario. In the backend, every HPC system consists of an HPC job scheduler built on top
of the primary Operating system; these are the two mandatory software layers required to
have a basic functional HPC system. Since any layer added to these layers might cause an
impact on performance, HPC Portals should incorporate solutions that have a minimal effect
on the system’s efficiency. These solutions could vary, and some of the examples are:
• Server Separation: Web portal could set-up their web-server as an example on a
separate node database server on another; this would reduce the bottleneck on the
main node.
• Local Cache Storage: Web portals could store user’s temporary data locally in the
browser to reduce the frequency of pushing and pulling data from the server, thus
reducing the local on the server.
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2.3 HPC Portal Solutions
This section will list the most known existing solutions available as an HPC Portal and
analyse their security vulnerabilities and implementations.
A survey titled Web Portals for High-performance Computing (Calegari et al., 2019) has
compared the existing HPC Portals.
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(Activeeon, 2014; Adaptive, 2006; Altair, 2019; Altair Korea Enterprise Computing Division,
2018; Apache, 2016; Atos, 2010; Bright Computing, 2019; Calegari et al., 2019; CyVerse, 2020;
Fujitsu, 2010, 2015; Hudak et al., 2018, 2016, 2017; Inside HPC, 2015; Marru et al., 2011;
McCormack et al., 1999; Nimbix, 2012; NIST, 1998; Pierce et al., 2014; Platform Computing,
2009; Quintero and International Business Machines Corporation. International Technical
Support Organization., 2012; Rescale, 2012; Sampedro et al., 2017; Sims et al., 2001; SysFera,
2014; The Agave Platform, 2013; UNICORE, 1997; Univa, 2019)
# Portal Release year Type
1 UNICORE Portal 1997 Open source
2 WebSubmit Portal by NIST 1998 (D)
3 EnginFrame by NICE/Amazon 1999 Commercial
4 Apache Airavata Django Portal 2003 Open source
5 eCompute by Altair 2003 Commercial (D)
6 eBatch by Serviware/Bull 2004 Commercial (D)
7 MOAB Viewpoint by Adaptive Computing 2006
8 HPCDrive by Oxalya/OVH 2007 Commercial (D)
9 HPC Pack Web Components by Microsoft 2008 Commercial
10 Compute Manager by Altair 2009 Commercial (D)
11 Platform Application Center (PAC) by IBM 2009
12 SynfiniWay by Fujitsu 2010 (D)
13 Sysfera-DS by Sysfera 2011 (D)
14 XCS1/XCS2 by Bull/Atos 2011 (D)
15 JARVICE Portal by Nimbix 2012
16 ScaleX Pro by Rescale 2012
17 Agave ToGo 2013 Open source
18 ProActive Parallel Suite by ActiveEon 2014 Open source
19 HPC Gateway Appli. Desktop by Fujitsu 2015
20 Sandstone HPC 2016 Open source
21 Open OnDemand 2017 Open source
22 XCS3 by Atos 2017
23 Orchestrate by RStor 2018
24 PBS Access by Altair 2018
25 Grid Engine by Univa 2019 Commercial
25 Bright Cluster Manager by Bright Computing 2019 Commercial
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2.3.1 Open OnDemand
Open OnDemand is an open-sourced web-based client portal for HPC systems based on the
Ohio Supercomputer Center OnDemand platform. The project addresses the gap between
traditional HPC access methods such as (SSH and VNC) and accessibility of HPC system
through the web (Hudak et al., 2018).
The project’s source code is available through Github (Center, 2020); the project presents
well-documented installation steps. To review this project, the latest version (1.7.14 at the
time of writing this) of the portal was installed and set up on a cloud server instance running
Centos 7.6. The portal had a number of functionalities, such as a web-based SSH client,
file-manager, and job manager. The portal uses Basic access authentication by default with
support for Shibboleth and CAS Single Sign-On and support for second-factor authentication
and OpenID through third-party integration. There was no implementation of data-gathering
methods in the project. However, support for Google Analytics was provided.
By analysing the portal and its source code, there were a number of security issue presented;
some of these issues will be listed below.
Third-party Libraries
The project makes use of a number of libraries in order to achieve it’s functionality, some of
these libraries are outdated and present the system with a number of security issues. As an
example, (A) jQuery (v3.4.1) (B) Cloud Commander (v5.3.1): provides the functionality of
SSH and file-manager through the web. Some of the vulnerabilities proposed by libraries A
& B will be listed below:
• Authentication Bypass (Library B)
• Cross-site Scripting (XSS) (Library B & A)
• (Regular Expression) Denial of Service ((Re)DoS) (Library B)
• Remote Memory Exposure (Library B)
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Inadequate Implementation
Along the vulnerabilities listed above, there is more security risk that is present within the
project itself:
• Authentication Credentials Capturing : as the portal makes use of basic access
authentication by default; this authentication mechanism encodes the username and
password pair to base64 format, the web application then passes these credentials in
the request header, allowing an attacker within the same network of the user to capture
their credentials using Man-In-The-Middle attack as an example.
• Header Misconfiguration: cross-domain configuration such as Access-Control-Allow-
Origin are misconfigured, allowing attackers to access requests through arbitrary third-
party domains. In addition, X-Frame-Options and X-Content-Type-Options are not
included, allowing possible ClickJacking and XSS attacks.
• Misconfigured Cookie: cookies initiated by the portal are lacking SameSite attribute,
which is a protection against cross-site request forgery, cross-site script inclusion, and
timing attacks.
• Inessential HTTPS: HTTPS is not required in order for the portal to function,
presenting the users with a high risk of website tampering and eavesdropping attacks.
Demonstrating XSS attack on Open OnDemand
From the vulnerability disscued above from library B, a user is able to create a file/directory
with an XSS payload such as "><svg onload=alert(’XSSpayload’);> as the name, this is then
reflected to all users accessing the same directory containing that payload as demonstrated
in figure 2.1.
2.3.2 Bright Cluster Manager
Bright Cluster Manager (BCM) by Bright Computing offers a complete solution for HPC
centres to build and manage clusters and allow users to submit and monitor jobs. Like most
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Fig. 2.1 Reflected XSS demonstration on Open OnDemand portal
HPC portal solutions presented in table 2.1, BCM is a commercial product meaning that the
software is proprietary. Therefore, information gathered about the software were mainly from
available manuals, documentation, and a live demonstration of a software (Bright Computing,
2019).
BCM dashboard has a monitoring functionality that features some measurable information,
mainly hardware gathered information such as usage and jobs data. BCM does not seem to
feature security-related information.
BCM’s developer manual describes a read-only Representational State Transfer (REST)
Application Programming Interface (API). However, this implementation uses basic access
authentication, which comes with critical security issues discussed in 2.3.1.
2.4 Security in HPC and Distributed Systems
High-Performance computing is a dominant tool for research in academia and industry
(Pellerin David et al., 2015), the increased development in HPC has resulted in providers
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being a desirable target to intruders (Peisert, 2017). In addition, the following are the main
aspect luring attackers to HPC: (1) substantial computational power (2) high bandwidth
network (3) massive storage capacity.
In the beginning, when HPC started being adopted for usage in research and education,
security which is one of the most significant concerns for both users and HPC system
maintainers, was not a significant problem. Nowadays, due to the extensive developments
made towards HPC portals. HPC vendors, such as Institutions or HPCaaS, are moving toward
delivering online interaction with their systems, such as HPC Portals, to their consumers
and clients. Users are provided with an easy access to a pool of high-performance computing
services through HPC systems. This access requires permission to use the internal network,
which is protected by security measures that ensure data protection. (Prout et al., 2016).
Also, HPC portals are made available remotely and accessed through the web. Thus, currently
facing the same security challenges being faced by cloud providers and web application.
There have been concerns about the security and privacy of the data in the cloud especially
from the business and governmental sectors due to the sensitivity of the data especially if the
data is considered to be a national assets (Armbrust et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2011). Studies
showed that there is a direct link between data protection laws and the interest in cloud
computing (Eldred et al., 2015, 2016). Another research proves that is a huge ambivalence
with the adoption of cloud computing due to the security, legal and privacy challenges that
cloud computing raises (Khajeh-Hosseini et al., 2010).
2.4.1 Security Challenges
Report made by Ponemon on security automation (Ponemon, 2013), shows that 88% of
data is stolen in minutes via cyber-attack or data breaches, 85% intrusions have not been
disproved until weeks later; also, the average mitigation time was 123 hours.
Another report written by Verizon (Verizon, 2019) supports Ponemon report, showing 51%
of compromises happens in seconds, 36% in minutes. In addition, 88% of Data exfiltration
happens in minutes. Moreover, 85% of threats are not discovered until weeks later.
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Nowadays, all attackers need is an exploitable vulnerability in any component in any layer
of a system, and they can access the system. On the other hand, attacks are receiving
more developments, increasing the number of zero-day exploits and malware that are able
to dodge most firewalls and software alike and able to spread more, making them persist longer.
Security Challenges in HPC
The Security of HPC systems has been a concern and a path of developments since the 1998
(Campbell and Mellander, 2011; Foster et al., 1998; James D. Ballew et al., 2015; Malin and
Van Heule, 2013)
Most common system vulnerabilities are still effective in HPC systems. However, due to an
HPC system’s characteristics, mitigations for those vulnerabilities are not effective and lack
efficiency (Apostal et al., 2012; Simakov et al., 2018).
There has been average progress done into researching security challenges in HPC portals.
There is however, a paper (Eldred et al., 2016) that reports a case study exploring security-
related queries around protecting sensitive data and the security decisions, as a result of a
survey conducted with a number of HPC organisations members. The papers show doubts
about data confidentiality in general, including where the data are stored, the authentication
and authorisation, and other security-related questions.
A paper from 2013 (Malin and Van Heule, 2013) has proposed Continuous Monitoring
for HPC systems. Continuous monitoring is a long-established method for desktop and
mobile operating systems that ensures constant and uninterrupted cyber protection via
multiple ways. The papers by Los Alamos National Laboratory HPC (Malin and Van Heule,
2013) have claimed that the organisation has started developing continuous monitoring
for HPC. Considering that an attacker might attempt to alter multiple vectors such as
firewall, system files and services, the paper has given a hypothetical approach to achieving
a continuous monitoring system. The approach consisted of the following elements:
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• Firewall Monitoring: a host-based firewall with a continuous test running to ensure
the firewall rules have not been altered or turned off.
• Logs Monitoring: constant monitor of logs to detect unauthorised changes in the
system. Orchestration tools could be used to revert the system to an optimal state.
• Services Monitoring: services are constantly monitored for changes.
• Security Tools Monitoring: constant monitoring for security tools to check if the
tools are functioning properly.
A study (Prout et al., 2016) suggested using Netfilter, a system-level feature, to create a
user-based firewall to administer the connections within the internal network of an HPC
system: this will allow administrators to implement a set of rules. This study has focused on
the impact of firewall rules on the performance of the HPC system.
According to multiple papers (Gantikow et al., 2016; Higgins et al., 2016; Priedhorsky and
Randles, 2017) authors proposed lightweight and secure solutions for HPC by containerising
middleware, environments, or software stacks. Such implementations do not consider exploits
resulted from the more advanced vulnerabilities such as Meltdown and Spectre (Kocher et al.,
2018; Lipp et al., 2018). A paper discussed the proposal of a security balance method for
HPC. The paper (Chen et al., 2017) scrutinised the traditional barrel/bucket theory and
proposed a new barrel theory. The theory consists of multiple barrels on the inside of the
other with each of the barrels representing the following as shown in figure 2.2: "data security,
system security, access control, application security, network security and physical security".
The study suggests security methods for each of the layers (buckets) and security measures
for the layers based on the new theory. The results are summarized in table 2.2.
A recent study (Luo et al., 2019) has emphasised the importance of log auditing in strength-
ening security for HPC systems. The study has listed multiple types of attacks in HPC
systems, and the paper reviews defence strategies for HPC systems.
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Fig. 2.2 New security balance method for HPC using the barrel theory (Chen et al., 2017)
Table 2.2 Security Layers (Chen et al., 2017)
Layers Methods
Data Content Auditing, Transfer Protocol
System Back-up, Policies, Firewall
Access Authentication, Authorization
Application Anti-Virus
Network Firewall, Network Standards
Physical Isolation, Monitoring
However, there are no current publications covering the effectiveness of measuring IP reputa-
tion, analysing users’ behaviour and other intelligent techniques within the HPC environment.
2.4.2 HPC Systems Performance and Security
High-Performance Computing systems, by definitions, are systems optimised for high-
performance. A factual statement is that the security of HPC is not being considered
differently than standard computing except for when security is antithetical with performance
(Peisert, 2017).
Red Hat has published an article (Red Hat, 2017) describing the performance impacts
of Meltdown and Spectre (Kocher et al., 2018; Lipp et al., 2018) which are hardware vul-
nerabilities that affected Intel processors, IBM POWER processors, and some ARM-based
microprocessors. The initial impact on performance was 1-20%. However, after optimising
the patches, it has been reduced to 1-8%.
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A 2018 paper (Simakov et al., 2018) examined the performance impact on HPC systems
when applying those patches for Meltdown and Spectre (Kocher et al., 2018; Lipp et al.,
2018). The paper has found that some HPC application decreased in performance up to 74%.
Another paper about user-based firewall (Prout et al., 2016) demonstrated no performance
issue while using a single-threaded Netcat (Kanclirz and Baskin, 2008) to transfer data.
However, once the test was repeated with ten threads, with 1000 connections each, the
test showed that the speed has halved. Two other papers have tested the performance
of Netfilter/iptables (by Harald Welte, 2000; Purdy, 2004), the results showed minimal
bottleneck, especially when handling a large set of rule and on gigabit networks (Hoffman
et al., 2003; Kadlecsik et al., 2004).
2.5 Security Solutions for HPC and Distributed Systems
Security tools are becoming more prevalent at all layers of the infrastructure, including
programme, network, host, and even client. Firewalls, rules-based network scanners, anti-
virus, IDP, and IPS are the most commonly used methods, as will be discussed later.
With these varieties of security tools protecting most components of a system, security
professionals "must be at an advantage". However, that is not the case, and infiltrators are
succeeding more often with more attacks.
From table 2.3 taken from a paper (Chugh and Chugh, 2010), security of HPC systems
could be divided into 3 layers (i) User/Application (ii) Communication (iii) Resource, each
of these layers are defined by it’s discipline. The authors suggest that existing technologies
could be applied to each discipline successfully. However, each of these technologies will have
constraints on HPC systems.
This section will review existing solutions to monitor and prevent cyber incidents in other
Infrastructure.
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Elemental Security technologies are the essential practices for securing HPC systems. The
following practices are used in many HPC providers contributing as a base layer of security
(Bulusu et al., 2018).
Operating System Security Hardeneing
This practice is the process of hardening the core of the HPC systems, ensuring that directories,
users, and services are set up with the correct level of privileges and permissions. Examples
of these hardening processes are:
• Password Complexity Requirement: a policy should be implemented to enforce
the requirements of a password; policies may include the length of the password,
complexity i.e. (special characters, numbers, alphabets). Password requirements could
increase the entropy of passwords (Marquardson, 2012)
• Password Expiration: setting a regular password change policy might not be a way
of preventing attackers from compromising passwords. However, it could definitely
help in reducing the potential damage from a compromised password (Marquardson,
2012; Zhang et al., 2010).
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• File Permission: Unix systems implements the owner, group, and other to files and
directories, meaning that every file has a single owner (Fenzi and Wreski, 2000). Correct
file permissions ensure that users have no access to crucial system files.
• Services and Packages: Additional unwanted services and packages open up oppor-
tunities for potential attacks, as an example, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 contains
over 1000 packages and services, most of which are not a necessity for HPC systems
(Dheshmukh and Mahalle, 2014). Over time packages becomes vulnerable, leaving
unpatched vulnerabilities in the system.
• File Integrity: ensuring the integrity of files are a crucial step in preventing many
attacks that typical anti-virus software would not be able to distinguish from a legitimate
use. An example of this is the recent Dirty Copy-On-Write (COW) vulnerability (Alam
et al., 2017; Red Hat, 2016).
• Log Management: collecting logs from different services and system components is
an imperative step for auditing security issues on a system (Vaarandi and Pihelgas,
2014). Logs will contain the activity of services, users and security events such as
elevated commands. A 2019 vulnerability has exploited Sudo version <1.8.28, allowing
a user to run a command as an arbitrary user (MITRE, 2019).
• Firewall: firewall rules offers enhanced network security. Rules should filter inbound
and outbound activity, limiting the system’s exposure to external and internal network
attacks (Prout et al., 2016).
Authentication
Authentication is of vital importance in protecting HPC systems from intruders. As explained
previously in section (Access to HPC Systems), there are multiple ways of accessing HPC
systems. Similarly, there are many methods for authenticating users; below are most of the
popular authentication methods:
• Password Authentication: using a password only to connect to the systems.
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• Public Key Authentication: client provides a key pair to the system where it gets
checked with a list of allowed keys.
• Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM): different modules could be used as
a way of authenticating users, e.g. (pam_ldap and pam_mysql).
Regular Security Auditing
One of the most significant security issues is the lack of regular security audits (Rasheed,
2014). However, auditing requires personnel’s familiarity with analysis tools and knowledge
of the current vulnerabilities. For HPC systems, patches could hugely impact performance,
as explained in section: (HPC Systems Performance and Security).
2.5.2 Security Information and Event Management System
Security Information and Event Management Systems (SIEM) provide Security Information
Management (SIM) such as log management and activity reports. Also, they provide Se-
curity Event Management (SEM) including real-time devices, network, and user’s activity
monitoring.
SIEM provides four main functionalities but is not limited to (Swift, 2006):
• Log Management: A smart logging server that logs from all nodes attached to a
system, the log should be reported to the SIEM System to be visualised for fast response.
Logs are collected from all different devices and software, such as authentication server
and user activity.
• Intrusion Detection: Artificial Intelligence automates the process of going through
logs and activity in order to detect suspicious behaviour within the system
• Incident Response Automation: Incidents should be reported to system adminis-
trators through some way of communication.
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• Forensic Investigation Management.
Fig. 2.3 Magic Quadrant for SIEM Evaluation Criteria Definitions
Figure 2.3 (Nicolett and Kavanagh, 2011) above represent the variety of Security Information
and Management Systems. There are 24 systems represented in a graph to show SIEM
systems’ ability compared to their marketing strategies.
Regarding the ability to execute considered product in terms of completeness, features,
capabilities, and other services provided, the highest was Hewlett Packard’s SIEM system
ArcSight which offers a wide range of features and cybersecurity tools. However, the system
has no support for High-Performance Computing System and does not include Artificial
Intelligence tools.
2.5.3 Security Orchestration Automation and Response
In 2017, Gartner, a global research and advisory firm, invented the term SOAR (Stan
Engelbrecht, 2018), to describe a system with layers of security tools stacked together. These
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tools allow the system to collect data from information about the security of a system from
different sources, detect threats, prioritising attacks, then to respond to these threats without
human input.
SOAR systems are very close in functionality to SIEM systems with the added functionality
of orchestration and automation.
Through the integration of Artificial Intelligence to existing SIEM systems to apply human
intelligence and machine learning would strengthen the Intrusion prevention in the system.
This solution would be beneficial for systems with a large amount of log data generated
hourly, such as in HPC systems.
In (Donevski and Zia, 2018), the author emphasises the importance and the demand on
security automation and management of anomalies, stating that the SOAR system is part of
the equation.
A substantial proof that SOAR systems are at the peak of demand and maturing, Splunk
acquiring Phantom, FireEye acquired Invotas, IBM acquired Resilient, and recently Microsoft
and Rapid7 acquired two more security companies. Most of these companies specialise in
SOAR systems (Jon Oltsik, 2018).
2.6 Artificial Intelligence Implementations in Security
The term "artificial intelligence" (AI) existed for more than 60 years, back when John
McCarthy, a mathematician and also known to be the creator of Artificial Intelligence,
defined a machine that could do what humans are able to do (Shannon, 1956).
With all the advancements that have been made towards Information Technology (IT) present-
ing internet users with convenience and accessibility in accessing diverse information, these
advancements have brought a variety of cybercrimes (Clough, 2015). Cyberattacks present a
global threat to computer systems rapidly, especially nowadays, where almost everyone could
have the knowledge and tools for attacking computer systems. Traditional security software
and Conventional fixed algorithms, such as detectors, are becoming insufficient in monitoring
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and protection systems. There is a need for a more astute security implementation capable
of differentiating normal and abnormal activities, also, able to react and make decisions in a
timely manner (Dilek et al., 2015). This scarcity could be satisfied with innovative solutions
such as Artificial Intelligence, giving the learning capabilities in monitoring, detection, and
making a decision that is similar to a human’s decisions (Nogueira, 2006; Tyugu, 2011). With
all of the possibilities offered within Artificial Intelligent solutions such as Neural Networks,
Machine Learning, Pattern Recognition, etc., there is a huge potential in such solutions in
improving the security of computer systems (Dasgupta, 2006; Patel et al., 2012; Xiao-bin
Wang et al., 2008).
As previously mentioned, AI implementation could perform human cognitive abilities and
could have sensory functions such as learning, analysing, and reasoning, thus detect then
categorise normal activities and differentiate them from abnormal behaviours.
Survey papers (Berman et al., 2019; Buczak and Guven, 2016; García-Teodoro et al., 2009;
Nguyen and Armitage, 2008; Sperotto et al., 2010; Wu and Banzhaf, 2010) have mentioned
and described the usage of Machine learning in cybersecurity and explained how it solves big
issues of cyber problems.
Some papers have explained the usage of machine learning (ML) or its deep subset learning
(DL) in cybersecurity for particular applications such as intrusion detection, malware, and
spam detection (Apruzzese, G.; Colajanni, M.; Ferretti, L.; Guido, A.; Marchetti, 2018;
Xin et al., 2018). In (Wickramasinghe et al., 2018) the authors explain the usage of DL
in defending cyber-physical systems. For the Internet of Things (IoT), there have been
achievements done in systems security ML (Al-Garadi et al., 2018).
2.6.1 Artificial Intelligent Intrusion Detection Systems
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) describes intrusion as the attempt
of compromising confidentiality, integrity, or availability (CIA). An intrusion Detection
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System (IDS) is a hardware or software that can monitor computer systems or network
communication to detect signs of such an attempt (Bace and Mell, 2001; Liao et al., 2013).
There have been several research publications proposing implementations of different AI
solutions to build an enhanced IDS systems. In (Linda et al., 2009), the authors presented
an IDS Neural Network model able to detect intrusion attempts with a 100% detection
rate. A similar paper has shown an increase in the detection rate in mobile IDS by reducing
false positives using Neural Network (Barika et al., 2009). Another paper has shown an
implementation of an anomaly IDS using Neural Network by training the model with the
KDD 1999 Data; the model was successful in learning packet behaviour (Al-Janabi and
Saeed, 2011). Using the same dataset, a paper (Ferreira et al., 2011) has presented another
Neural network-based IDS with an accuracy of 99.98% detection rate. Another paper with
a Neural network-based IDS using the KDD 1999 dataset has seen a 100% detection rate
similar to conventional IDS. However, it has produced a performance increase in detecting
Denial of Service attacks (Barman and Khataniar, 2012). There are more papers that have
presented similar implementations (EshghiShargh, 2009; Ferreira et al., 2011; Hassan, 2013;
Herrero et al., 2007; Jongsuebsuk et al., 2013; Ou et al., 2011; Shao-jing et al., 2011; Shosha
et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011).
2.6.2 Artificial Intelligence in Access Control
Authentication is a critical step in authorising users to access protected information and
resources safely. Throughout the years, there have been many methods used to authenticate
users. Text passwords are the most common authentication method. Since 1979 a research
of over forty years old showed that passwords come with large security risk (Morris and
Thompson, 1979). However, since then, there have been different methods of access control.
Table 2.4 shows the ontology of different authentication methods that have been used or
could be used to assist in authorising users.
There is a continuous demand in finding new means of authenticating user’s identity (Purgason
and Hibler, 2012). This subsection will cover related work where some of the authentication
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Table 2.4 User Authentication Methods Ontology
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methods shown in table 2.4 are assisted with Artificial Intelligence to improve its performance
and increase the general security of access control.
There has been a number of research papers published on how to collect and analyse users
behavioural biometrics data to be used as an authentication method or as a second-factor
authentication. Although some papers have shown successful implementation of identifying
imposter and differentiating between individuals without the use of AI by analysing rhythms
in users typing (Bergadano et al., 2003), recent studies have shown that the newer generation
of malware and bots are capable of performing synthetic attacks (Serwadda et al., 2011).
Therefore, there is a need to implement an intelligent system to counter these types of attack.
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) were used in a study to build an authentication and
discrimination system by recording keystrokes and the time interval between presses of
users when inputting their passwords; this was then converted into an RGB histogram and
train the ANN with this data. The system was successful in identifying 90% of legitimate
attempts and 90% of frauds (Alpar, 2014). Another paper had a similar implementation for
a web application where the users’ password input properties such as timing interval and the
duration of keystrokes were used to train an ANN. This implementation has produced an
average of 1% error rate. Similarly, in (Purgason and Hibler, 2012), the authors have produced
encouraging results in collecting and analysing behavioural data in order to authenticate
user’s identity.
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In a 2019 study, authors have discussed the importance of artificial intelligence in user
authentication. Authors have developed a program to gather data from a small number
of users accessing the website and recording (i) mouse click timestamp (ii) coordinates of
the mouse and browser window (iii) URL frequency related information. The data was
then fed to multiple machine learning algorithms and showed an increase in the accuracy of
classification compared to other studies (Kogos et al., 2019).
With the increased usage of internet in users’ daily life (We Are Social, 2020), there is
enough data to be collected from their users’ interaction with a web page in order to identify
each user uniquely (Abramson, 2014a,b; Abramson and Aha, 2013) or partially (Fridman
et al., 2013, 2017). This has not been implemented in HPC systems, with the potential of
preventing unauthorised access. Implementing a system to collect the required data from the
users and use it to identify threats would be a contribution to the community.
2.7 Shortcoming of existing HPC Security Practices
High-Performance Computing Systems are used to for computationally and data intensive
applications, meaning that any performance degradation caused by security implementations
such as IDS/IPS are undesirable. In addition, HPC systems are typically run in critical
industries, process valuable information, and serve certain important customers. Due to this,
High-Performance Computing environments represent a unique paradigm when compared
to other computer systems environments (Bridges et al., 2002). Backing up this statement,
HPC systems have distinct modes of operation, in addition to that the exotic applications
used by the users which tend to be open to users raising a high security threat (Peisert,
2018).
According to HPCSec, a security specialist for HPC environments, HPC is a niche area where
most security experts have not had the experience to work with HPC technologies. Also,
security practices are not applied within the HPC field, and traditional security tools are not
built to be suitable for HPC systems (HPCsec, 2019).
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The University of Huddersfield’s High-Performance Computing QueensGate Grid (QGG)
receives a large number of SSH login attempts on a daily basis. For example, table 2.5 shows
the number of failed SSH login attempts recorded in a 24-hour timeframe per country; the
total number of attacks was 46890 from 9378 different IP addresses, all of which were banned
from further attempts. During the 24-hour timeframe, login attempts were limited to 5
attempts per IP address every 15 minutes, meaning this number could be vastly increased if
such limitation did not exist.
Table 2.5 Failed SSH login attempts on QGG during a 24-hours timeframe
Country SSH Attempts # IP Addresses
China 18145 3629






South Korea 1315 263
Other 13065 2613
Total 46890 9378
Looking at the literature, there has been little achievements in ML for security systems in
distributed systems, and no advancements in security of HPC.
2.8 Shortcomings of the Existing Security Implementation for
HPC
Throughout reviewing the literature, it was proven that attacks have a life cycle. Attacks
such as breaches take years to discover, especially in large organizations (Verizon, 2020).
Based on the literature review conducted of the current state of HPC systems in terms of
security and access methods, the following shortcomings are apparent:
1. SSH is used by most HPC centres and has not advanced in security; it relies on a
trusted-host authentication mechanism (PKI) by blindly trusting the host providing
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the keys, making it an insecure practice hence the May 2020 attack where a malicious
group targeted academic HPC centres in order to mine cryptocurrencies. The group
was able to get access to several HPC grids by hopping between compromised SSH
accounts.
2. Portals lack the automation in managing HPC security. Some portals also lack basic
modern security requirements, as proven in the Open OnDemand portal.
3. No Artificial intelligent based implementations to autonomously manage security within
the HPC environment.
4. No standard framework that was developed for HPC systems to address the issues
stated above.
The gaps in knowledge identified above demonstrate a lack of a unified approach across the
UK research and Higher Education institution for secure access to the HPC systems. There
are developments of HPC portals that attempt to migrate security issues, Nevertheless, they
lack in automating the task of detecting anomalies of users’ activities using AI tools.
In chapter 3, the Bearicade system is proposed to overcome the shortcomings of the existing
security and access systems.
2.9 Research Questions
There a three main research questions that need to be addressed in this research:
• How can the technologies and data provided by this research contribute to the develop-
ment and implementation of SOAR system in HPC?
• To what extent such an implementation can protect HPC systems and authorised
access?
• Will such implementation help in the Management and the usability of HPC systems?
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In order to address the research questions and validate and evaluate the proposed novel
SOAR framework for HPC system security, a combination of quantitative, qualitative and
experimental empirical research methods will be used. Surveys of users’ experience will
be used to gather and analyse qualitative data on the system’s usability. Data gathered
from the experiments of SOAR implementation and deployment of AI tools in the existing
HPC systems will be used to validate and evaluate the proposed novel system for enhancing




Security Orchestration Automation and Response (SOAR) has a potential to counter emerging
security concerns in HPC systems. The SOAR principles were used when developing a novel
framework - Bearicade to address the concerns in HPC systems security.
“When designing an HPC portal, as for any other software, use cases have to be thoroughly
studied and specified. All HPC portal functions and features are not always used or even
used at all, depending on the use case. Not all HPC portal users have the same objectives
or use the same workflows. The same applies to organizations delivering the HPC service”
(Calegari et al., 2019)
Bearicade is built on well-known browser features, and it allows for smooth management
and connectivity to HPC systems without requiring specialised user training. The Bearicade
system’s architecture is depicted in Figure 3.1. The two-factor authentication used for user
registration and authorization is either a time-based one-time password or an universal
second factor (U2F). System protection is accomplished by continuously tracking, analysing,
and interpreting data, such as user interaction, server requests, devices, and geographical
locations, among other things. System managers will be able to see unusual user behaviour.
and will facilitate prompt actions in order to mediate the threats. Also, the system does
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not use SSH as its main external access gateway to the system. Instead, it uses the web











Fig. 3.1 System Architecture Layers for Bearicade (Al-Jody et al., 2020)
In order to demonstrate the performance and the functionality of the proposed framework
and to gather information required for the system to be implemented and developed, a
proving ground has to be set up in the form of an HPC system test-bed. Bearicade will be
deployed and used in the University of Huddersfield’s QueensGate Grid (QGG) main HPC
management system. Bearicade will be implemented on top of the three HPC systems layers,
as seen in figure 3.1, similar to other software access methods for HPC systems; the three
base layers are the physical layer, the system layer, and the middleware layer.
3.2.1 Physical Layer
The physical layer is the base hardware layer of any HPC systems, representing the backbone
of HPC systems granting the powerfulness for the system. In a typical HPC environment,
grid utilizes the power of large sets of computing resources to meet the needs of compiling
intensive high-performance computing, as represented in figure 3.2. Grids consists of multiple
clusters that could be in numerously geographical locations, each of the clusters is a set of
nodes often connected. The clusters mainly consist of a single head node and a number
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Fig. 3.2 Typical HPC Grid Components
of worker nodes. Clusters and nodes could have a variety of functions contributing to the
operability of an HPC grid, i.e. compute, network, management, backup, and storage.
Customarily grids should be connected via a network, enabling the ease of managing all
nodes within each cluster.
Bearicade is designed to run in a separate node(s), meaning that it does not affect the current
configuration of any HPC systems. Bearicade could be deployed on a bare-metal machine or
container ready machine as will be explained in the Deployement of Bearicade section.
3.2.2 System Layer
System layer is the base Operating System (OS) layer of an HPC system, a number of HPC
centres uses RedHat Linux, including RedHat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) and CentOS, which
is compiled version of the open-sourced RedHat Linux. Over the past years, a number of
HPC-ready OS made available such as ROCKS (Rocksclusters, 2018) being one of the last
surviving OS as of 2018 is also based on CentOS. Another popular Linux distributions are
SUSE Enterprise Linux (SLE) and Debain based distributions such as Ubuntu. Both RHEL
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and SLE uses RPM Package Manager (RPM) to build sources for HPC systems (OpenHPC
Community, 2018).
3.2.3 Middleware
At the University of Huddersfield, deployments of High-Performance computing clusters are
automated through the use of an orchestration tool. This tool is called Ansible, which is an
open-source software provisioning, configuration management, and application-deployment
tool (Red Hat, 2019).
An ansible playbook has been developed at the University of Huddersfield (Higgins et al.,
2018), the playbook uses OpenHPC, which provides all HPC components in a package
(OpenHPC Community, 2018). For the deployment and provisioning of the nodes in every
cluster, the playbook uses Extreme Cluster Administration Toolkit (xCAT), which is an
open-source deployment and provisioning middleware (XCAT, 2018). By providing a config
file and a machine file to include the list of nodes, sensible playbill copied install, boot, and
manage all nodes (Clusterworks, 2018).
3.2.4 Bearicade Stack
Bearicade is a full-stack application that drives the 3 HPC layers (Physical, System, and
Middleware), as with full-stack components, there are two layers to the stack. The controller,
which is the backend of Bearicade being the closest to the HPC system layer. It handles
operations with the system components below it as shown in figure 3.2. The second layer of
the stack is the Web portal which is the frontend of Bearicade and the closest to the users; it
handles users’ interactions and uses the controller to feedback to the system.
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Data Storage
Bearicade is a data-driven framework, meaning that without the information collected from
the users, it would not be able to achieve its purpose. Due to the large number of users of
Bearicade and the number of data generated (i.e. activity, logs), Bearicade requires a reliable,
scalable, and most importantly, secure database. Bearicade makes use of two databases
under the same server, the first of which is an authentication database that stores users login
credentials, sessions, system configuration, and attempts. The second database is used to
store all activities of the users; examples of these data include: how the users interact with
Bearicade, what commands and activity they perform, and classification data. MySQL is the
database server used, is an open-source relational database management system. Data such
as web-server logs and other logs are stored locally in the gateway, enabling rapid append of
data. Section Data Acquisition will explain the types of information being logged and the
purpose of these data.
Controller
Bearicade’s backend is the heart of Bearicade, driving and managing all components together.
The controller is divided into three sub-layers in Bearicade’s backend that together form the
controller; this way, the complexity of the controller is reduced, reducing the load and issues
that could occur in the system. The controller layers are:
• Systems Controller: This layer is what interacts with actual head nodes of the
distributed system. It manages creating, reading, updating, deleting, and syncing local
users to and from all nodes,
• Terminal and File Manager Controller: Terminal and File Manager described in
section (Web-based Terminal and File Manager) uses this layer in order to initiate SSH
login to different nodes, sending commands, and perform file manager actions.
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• Users Management Controller: This layer has no major interaction with the nodes,
as it’s only used to store users’ account information, credentials, activity, and actions.
All of these data are stored in a separate database
On the ground of having multiple layers to the controller, interactions with the controller are
managed by a single endpoint via a Representational State Transfer (REST) Application
Program Interface (API). Especially with modularity in mind, REST API gives the ability
to developers to design modular plugin for Bearicade, all with the least cost on performance
on the gateway node.
By design, the controller is what manages all parts of the system, meaning that this layer is
the most important layer of Bearicade in the sense of enhancing security. Therefore, it is
crucial giving guidelines to this layer; guidelines will determine what the controller is able
and not able to do. These guidelines are:
1. Data validation: part of quality control of the system, all data received from any
user is validated against a set of requirement defined for each action. This includes the
data type and data filtering.
2. Predefined actions: set of actions are predefined for the controller. The controller is
not able to do additional actions unless implemented by administrators.
3. Minimal User Input: inputs from users are kept to a minimum to ensure the ease
of data validation and reduce risk.
4. Action Logs: all activities that a user performs is logged automatically, as shown in
table (3.3) logs include the what, who, and when data from an activity no matter what
the outcomes are.
5. Linux Permissions: Bearicade Controller runs on the gateway system as a normal
user with privileged access to necessary actions/commands only.
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Web Portal
Bearicade is designed to rely the most of it’s functionality on the backend, meaning multiple
web portals could be developed on a single backend. Nevertheless, a web portal (frontend) is
the only way users are interacting with the systems. Therefore there are multiple aspects
that had to be considered in the design process for this project, as part of the functional and
non-functional requirements for web portal. The frontend is where most of the requirements
are implemented.
• Usability: part of the non-functional requirement for an HPC web portal as explained
in section (Usability)
• Job and Data Management: most operative function for an HPC web portal, discussed
in section (Job Management and Data Management)
• Performance: Bearicade does not impact the performance of HPC systems as it lies in
a separate gateway node.
Keeping the requirements in mind, the web portal had to be designed accordingly.
Deployement of Bearicade
Deployement Orchestration
To keep consistency in the software architecture of the middleware described in section
(Middleware), the deployment process followed a similar orchestration method used in
(Higgins et al., 2018) by developing an ansible playbook. Ansible as an orchestration tool is
a great choice for HPC since it allows access to the nodes in a cluster by using SSH with the
default Public Key Infrastructure. This allows the tool to work without having third-party
agents to be installed on the nodes nor creating a secondary Public Key Infrastructure key
sets for the purpose of establishing a connection. Also, the configuration procedure is divided
into roles which are stored in a YAML file on the system, allowing an administrator to
easily toggle tasks, tweak the configuration, and define nodes by copying and modifying the
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configuration file without the need for an external database, or central providers which is
exactly what is needed for a geographically distributed systems such as grids.
Containerized vs Bare Metal Environment
Running the Bearicade stack or any software will require a bare metal server to run on, a
containerization solution such as docker on top of the bare metal server could be used to
isolate the software environment. This allows the software to be in a separate environment
which tends to have a better security as it separates the hosts files from the container files.
Containerized solutions could be an enhancement to a system when it is combined with an
orchestration tool as it would allow the reconfiguration of the software without requiring to
re-install Operating System on the host’s system, without compatibility being an issue as
it shares the hosts operating system. In regards to performance, containerization usually
tends to add an additional layer to a system, such as a docker engine in the case of docker.
In HPC systems, both performance and isolation are required (Xavier et al., 2013), and for
this reason, the Bearicade stack could be installed on a separate server node that could act
as the gateway node. This should not affect the performance of the actual HPC compute
nodes at the same time allowing the isolation needed for better security practices and the
ease of reconfiguration. Bearicade stack can be installed on a bare-metal machine without
the use of containerization software. Also, it can be deployed on multiple containers to allow
for better continuous development.
Bearicade Stack Deployement
Bearicade stack consists of 3 Ansible playbooks, each with its own roles. Playbooks allow
administrators to run a fully configured and user-ready Bearicade stack
1 nodes:
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Code 3.1 API for listing users










As mention in section 3.2.4, Bearicade is a data-driven framework, all of Bearicade’s function-
alities are made possible by the data it collects. Data is what makes the identification of a
wide variety of attacks and the prevention of such attacks possible on a system. Thus, digital
data collection is an important aspect of security for many organizations (Cobb et al., 2018).
As shown in figure 3.3, from an HPC user’s perspective regarding granting access to the
system, in order for the request made by the user attempting access to be approved, the user
must provide multiple sets of data. The first set is the User Identification Data (UID);
this data is stored as plain text in the database. It would be available for all administrators
to preview at any point in time. User’s Identification Data is as follows:
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Fig. 3.3 HPC Systems Architecture in the University of Huddersfield from a user’s perspective
• Email Address: In the registration phase, the vital data could be used to decide if the
domain used in the registration to be allowed or not. For example (’*.ac.uk’ could be
used to only allow/deny International academic institution). Also, it is used to contact
the user at any time. Depending on the scenario, it may be used as a multi-factor
authentication if needed.
• Name: only used for reference; also, it could be used as part of the verification process
if needed.
• Username: similar to name, with the addition of being used part of the student
verification process (e.g. Student/Researcher/Staff ID).
• Identification Number: randomly generated and added to the user database, making
it effortless for the system to manage users.
The second set of data are the User Secret Data (USD), the vital information that belongs
to the user. The majority of these data are hidden from administrators.
• Two-factor authentication secret: This secret is randomly generated by the system
using a Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG). during
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the registration process and is presented to the user to be saved or scanned via a Quick
Response code (QR).
• Password: Taken from the user and checked on client-side and server-side for strength
requirements predefined. The Password is hashed via bcrypt with an expensive key
setup phase. Also, a 256-bit of random salt added to every hash, making the data is
resilient to data breaches and rainbow tables.
The third set of data are User Classification Data (UCD). These data are collected by
the system from the user’s connection such as:
1. Devices: from every device the following data could collect:
• System Languages.
• System fonts.
• Platform such as operating system, version.
• Web programs such as Java.
• Local system time.
2. Browsers, play a vital role in data collection, from the browser many values could be
gathered, to help improving the system some of these data are:
• Same domain Cookies (e.g. as the system domain is qgg.hud.ac.uk it is part of
hud.ac.uk , meaning all cookies set to *.hud.ac.uk would be gathered.
• Browser version and extension.
• Navigation such as browser history and Referrer.
• Screen resolution.
3. Internet connection is really important in our case since the system could collect
Internet Service Provider (ISP) details, Internet protocol address and sometimes internal
IP address. From these details we could identify:
• Virtual Private Network is used (VPN), The Onion Router (TOR), Crawlers.
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• IP Threat level (from popular databases).
• Country, and City (accuracy depending on ISP).
• Proxies used.
• Timezone (to be compared with browser and device).
The final set of data is the User Behaviour Data (UBD); these data summarizes how the
user is interacting with Bearicade.
There are two components in this set, the first being the data collected from the users’
interaction with the website via hardware devices such as keyboard or mouse. Collection of
this information has to be done via the client-side, therefore, a Javascript library (Al-Jody,
2019) was implemented into Bearicade that would allow the collection of the behavioural
information shown in table 3.2. Behavioural data is then passed to the backend server for
validation and storage.
Table 3.2 Example of the behavioural data collected from Bearicade users
Data Description
userInfo record browser/device details
clicks track mouse clicks
mouseMovement track mouse movement
mouseMovementInterval time between tracking mouse movements
mouseScroll track mouse scroll
timeCount track time
The second component is the user’s activity which is collected from the actions the user
performs from the web-based terminal and file manager, and if the user is an administrator,
more data are collected such as create, read, update and delete (CRUD) functions on the
system’s data (i.e. users, API). An example of this information is shown in table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Action data collected from Bearicade users
ID date component action
1 2020-01-17 11:27:58 System Created User:"u1762746"
1 2020-02-03 12:08:30 User Deleted:"106"
1 2020-03-01 18:13:11 Terminal Command:"ls -la". Sent to: "cygnus" [Success]
1 2020-04-01 18:13:06 File Manager Command:"ls" [Success]
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More data are collected from unauthenticated users to help secure Bearicade from anonymous
users. The information is collected when an anonymous user access Bearicade and attempts
to authenticate. Attempts data includes Internet Protocol (IP) address of suspected users,
along with the total of attempts and expiration date of a ban which is configurable within
Bearicade.
Another set of information that is collected by Bearicade is the data from the web-server,
and it holds records of requests made to any endpoint of Bearicade; such records holds data
shown in table 3.4
Table 3.4 Example of Bearicade’s web-server data log





Host, path, escaped queries, fragments qgg.hud.ac.uk, /access?action, #top
Unix timestamp
Size
Status 200, 404, 301
Latency
User Identification
Man In The Middle detection likely, unlikely
Referrer
Cookie authentication token
Remote IP address and port
Browser user agent (OS, browser versions)
3.2.6 Application Programming Interface (API)
The system uses an Application Program Interface (API) which is a software intermediary
that contains predefined actions and dictates how the software’s components should interact
with the servers. API is needed so that it could authenticate the different users’ interactions
with the back-end servers, maintaining privacy and authority of the data.
When a client loads the web page, depending on the user’s role/permission, the system
renders all elements required for the selected role. When all the elements have loaded, the
system multiple POST requests to the API in order to get all the data required to place for
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Fig. 3.4 Application Program Interface (API)
the elements. At this point, all the steps above are done on the client-side except for the
page data. From now on, the API receives the request and starts processing it. As shown in
figure 3.4, the API server checks for the users’ Login token and tries to verify it in order to
get the following variables:
• If user’s token is active and logged in without a change in the User Classification Data
(UCD).
• If the user has sufficient permission to run the requested action.
• If the user’s request is valid and requiring an existing function from the API.
After all of the variables above are gathered and depending on the output, the API processes
the request with the Database and returns a response to the client, which might contain
valid output or an error for the user interface to process.
Below is an example of a request made to the API end-point, with no token, cookie, or action
provided
1 > POST /controller/api.php HTTP /1.1
2 > Host: qgg.hud.ac.uk
3 > User -Agent: insomnia /6.5.4
4 > Accept: */*
5 > Content -Length: 0
Code 3.2 Request Header
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1 < HTTP /1.1 200 OK
2 < Content -Type: application/json
3 < Server: Caddy
4 < X-Powered -By: PHP /7.2.14
5 < Date: Mon , 10 Jun 2019 21:42:34 GMT
6 < Content -Length: 30
Code 3.3 Response Header
1 {
2 "error": "Permission Denied"
3 }
Code 3.4 Response Body (JSON)
From the example above, the server checks for the users provided details and returns an
error: permission denied.
If the same request was sent again with modified header values, API will make sure to produce
the required response. The request has an added query of a and value of failsCount in-order
to return the number of failed logins for the system.
The Request header will be as follows:
1 > POST /controller/api.php?a=failsCount HTTP /1.1
2 > Host: qgg.hud.ac.uk
3 > User -Agent: insomnia /6.5.4
4 > cookie: authID =7 b8f23a657ba8723ce6293257fcd9a80c3a40966; config=null
5 > Accept: */*
6 > Content -Length: 0














Code 3.6 Request Body
API Actions
As stated, the API has abundant functions to pull all required data for all software components.
The API checks for permissions and the user’s role before attempting to execute an action.
Some actions that require extra permissions would be stated in the action declaration before
attempting to query the data, for example:
1 //list all users action
2 if($isAdmin){




6 $res = array(’error ’ => ’Permission Denied ’);
7 }
Code 3.7 API for listing users
Example list of available actions for Users and Groups control and its functionality:
• listUsers: List all system users from all roles.
• deleteUser: Deletes a system user from the database without deleting local systems
account or data.
• toggleUserActive: Enable or disable user’s account temporarily.
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• listGroups: List all system groups.
• createGroup: Create a group (different from local system groups).
• viewUserBrowserRecords: All devices and browsers a specific user has used to
interact with the system.
• viewUserActivity: List what the user is performing on the system or the web
dashboard.
• viewUserLoginRecords: Every login from a user.
• viewUser: List User Identification Data.
API Keys
The user requesting the action can be authenticated in two ways; the first is as explained
before, being logged in and has a valid cookie containing the login data.
The second method is via API keys, this approach was implemented in order to give the
system a modularity aspect where developers are able to incorporate an additional module
that might be able to enhance the security or improve user experience.
1 MTIzNDU =. dab3734e2eaddcba5e4bb5a8234317e1
Code 3.8 API Key
Keys consists of two parts; the first is a base64 encoded ID of the user; the second part is the
actual key (example 3.8). The key is generated by using an OpenSSL pseudo-random string
of bytes consisting of 20 characters, following that MD5 hash is calculated of the random
string, and the hash is then password hashed using the algorithm bcrypt.
API keys can be authenticated to access API the system only if no present cookie is provided.
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User Authentication
Users accessing Bearicade’s RESTful API end-point is a multi-process procedure. Figure 3.5,
describes this procedure in details, and the processes go as follows as the users access the
end-point:
1. The server checks for a present authID cookie; if a cookie is available, the server will
check with the backend database to see if a valid session exist; if no valid session were
found, then the system would deny the request.
2. If the server could not find a cookie, the server would check if the HTTP_API_KEY
header is set. If the header is set, then thorough checks will be carried to confirm the
key’s validity:
2.1. Key length is valid.
2.2. Key containing two parts separated by a dot (.).
2.3. Part of the key is an encoded base64 code.
2.4. Part of the key returns a valid user ID.
3. if the session of the cookie active or API key is valid, the server will check if an action
is supplied, which would then check if the user requesting the action is permitted to
that particular action. If permitted, the server would process the action, returning the
data requested. If not, the server would deny the request.































Fig. 3.5 Authenticating Users to Bearicade’s RESTful API
3.2.7 Web-based Terminal and File Manager
Fig. 3.6 Terminal and File manager API
Similar to the API used to establish a connection to the database, Terminal and File manager
API follows the same architecture to allow users to access local files all from within the online
portal.
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As demonstrated in figure 3.6, following the checks made by the web-server for the session,
permission and request. Following the initial checks, which would confirm the integrity
of the user, the system checks for the target path attached to the request, ensuring the
confidentiality of the data and the availability of the system are left intact.
Subsequently, the system loads a generated private key for the targeted user, depending on
the requested action, an SFTP or SSH connection is created and is valid for one request only.
This connection would still follow the systems policies and permissions and would log in as
the user who commenced the request.
There are additional features in the system, which are smart filters that are able to deny
a command providing that the command is blacklisted. For example, if the user runs a
command in /home/user folder such as:
1 rm -rf *
Code 3.9 Deleting files
This command would be allowed and passed to the system. However, if the user is running
the following a slightly modified command in /home/user folder such as:
1 cd /home/anotherUser /; rm -rf *
Code 3.10 Deleting another users files
This command would be denied by the filter, and the user attempting would be flagged, and
their account would be deactivated. Clearly, even if the filter has failed and the command
was passed to the system, user permissions of the system would deny it. The filter only gives
an insight into the users’ activity to systems administrators.
3.3 Security Implementations
According to William Cheswick and Steve Bellovin, "... any program, no matter how
innocuous it seems, can harbour security holes ... We thus have a firm belief that everything
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is guilty until proven innocent." (McGraw, 2006; Viega, 2002). A statement that has proven
to be true by the number of cyberattacks that has happened targeting multiple institutions.
In May 2020, a malicious group targeted academic data centres for CPU cryptocurrency
mining purposes. The group has successfully hopped between compromised SSH accounts
to get access to different HPC grids (EGI CSIRT, 2020). Many of the HPC centres have
been affected by this cyberattack and this has caused a lengthy downtime in some cases.
Fortunately for the University of Huddersfield’s QueensGate Grid, Bearicade was put in
place and remote SSH functionalities for users were disabled.
Throughout the years, there has been a number of published papers describing guidelines on
building secure web applications. However, as technologies advances, cyber-attacks such as
compromising HPC systems advances and becomes increasingly advantageous. Implementing
a number of security mechanisms does not build an invulnerable system; instead, cybersecurity
is a continuous process (Arbaugh, 2002). Software development is a challenging process,
especially with limited resources (Fenton, 2014), adding to that building secure software is a
time consuming and intense challenge (Abunadi and Alenezi, 2016).
3.3.1 The Open Web Application Security Project
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a nonprofit organization led by
community security experts providing open-source projects, educational training conferences,
and guidelines aiming to build secure software systems and securing the web. One of the most
important projects by The Open Web Application Security Project is OWASP top-ten which
focuses on developers and web application security, providing a broad list of the most critical
security risks targeting web application. The latest version of this document is 2017; this data
was gathered from specialized security firms, individual surveys, data span vulnerabilities
from hundreds of organizations, and live applications and APIs (OWASP.org, 2017).
This section will focus on details of the top ten security risks explaining the risks that might
have an effect on Bearicade, their impact, and prevention techniques. Table 3.5, shows the
OWASP top ten list of security risks (A1-A10). Some of these risks arise when a particular
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A3 Sensitive Data Exposure
A4 XML External Entities (XXE)
A5 Broken Access Control
A6 Security Misconfiguration
A7 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A8 Insecure Deserialization
A9 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
A10 Insufficient Logging & Monitoring
technology is implemented in the web application. Therefore, some of the risks are not a
potential problem for Bearicade, such as A4 XML External Entities (XXE) due to not having
an XML processor.
Injection
A1 Injection is a top-ranked risk in the OWASP top ten for 2013 and 2017 issues. At any
aspect of the application where there is data handling, there is a potential vector for injection.
Since Bearicade relies on SQL database, there is a potential for SQL Injection vulnerabilities
which could result in a data breach, corruption, unauthorized modification, and denial of
service. Bearicade provides a safe REST API described in Application Programming Interface
(API). The API provides a parameterized interface with server-side input validation in order
to eliminate hostile data. Requests made to the API are only available to authenticated
users, and all requests are logged for continuous monitoring.
Broken Authentication
A2 Broken Authentication is the 2nd top-ranked risk in the OWASP top ten for 2013 and
2017 issues, Broken Authentication is when an attacker has access to a list of login details
combinations, or a breached datasets of username and passwords and the attacker is able
to perform a brute force type of attack on the system by trying out combinations, this is
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possible at any point of the authentication process. Bearicade’s users are obliged to use a
password with a specific strength that is then scrutinized on the backend using a pattern
matching and minimum entropy calculation where a minimum score that is measured on the
probability of guesses is allowed. Another prevention method implemented on Bearicade is
a Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) two-factor authentication (2FA) system. The
users are not able to register on the system without 2FA. Also, there is a configurable limit
on the number of tries for failed login attempts. Upon exceeding the limit, the attempting
user will be banned by IP address. Further prevention could be done by disabling the user
account that is being targeted.
Sensitive Data Exposure
A3 Sensitive Data Exposure is performed by an attacker by stealing data from the user’s
client such as a browser through man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks or gathering plain-text
data from a server through a data breach, or performing cryptographic decryption on data
that was encrypted using a weak algorithm. Although MITM attacks usually target the
client-side and most popular browsers and security software have implemented a method to
protect the user against them, misconfigured backends could assist an attacker in successfully
hijacking the client’s communication with the server.
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Secure Renegotiation (CVE-2009-3555) ✓
Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation (CVE-2011-1473) ✓
CRIME, TLS (CVE-2012-4929) ✓
BREACH (CVE-2013-3587) ✓
POODLE, SSL (CVE-2014-3566) ✓
SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183 CVE-2016-6329) ✓
FREAK (CVE-2015-0204) ✓




RC4 (CVE-2013-2566 CVE-2015-2808) ✓
In the last ten years, there has been a number of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE) shown in table 3.6 that has been used in attacks such as MITM. These CVEs
have targeted specific versions of SSL/TLS. In order to be well-protected against these
CVEs, Bearicade is not supporting older versions of SSL/TLS and only offer a successful
handshake with browsers supporting TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. This will cause outdated and
insecure browsers with a handshake failure error. Moreover, Bearicade’s web server uses
2048 bits SHA256 key with RSA and have explicitly defined supported cypher suites denying
downgrade attacks and decryption of secure communication. Using a method described in
(Durumeric et al., 2017) as a prevention technique, Bearicade’s web server uses a plugin to
help detect HTTPS interception by grading the user’s client using tests such as (i) TLS
Versions supported (ii) Cipher Suites provided (iii) Multiple Certificate Validation (iv) Known
TLS Attacks. Bearicade will not authorise clients scoring a low grade, presenting them with
a message, and the request will be logged.
Broken Access Control
A5 Broken Access Control are one of the primary exploitation that is performed by an
attacker to trick the server into performing a request on behalf of other users without the
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required permissions, and this could lead to a leak, unintended modification, or loss of data.
A 2018 study has analysed 330 web applications from the educational, governmental, health,
and private sectors. The analysis conducted has concluded that 39% of the web applications
tested were vulnerable to Broken Access Control attacks caused by improper input validation,
data disclosure, and insecure sessions (Hassan et al., 2018). As discussed, by design Bearicade
does not trust user inputs from unauthorised users to administrative accounts; this is why
user inputs go through input scrutinisation on both client and server-side. Also, when an
authenticated user performs a request to Bearicade’s API, the user does not explicitly provide
a piece of identification information; instead, a cookie is passed along with every request, the
scrutinisation cookie value is then checked for its validity by checking active sessions, then
the user’s device user agent and IP address are verified against the initiator’s user agent and
IP address. This process repeats in the backend server every time a request is initiated; this
control mechanism is present throughout the application.
Header Configuration
Bearicade provides an API to third-party applications in order to build modular plugins for
Bearicade, allowing the implementation of more advanced features and security enhancements.
For this reason, Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) has been implemented into the API.
CORS is a system that determines whether an application is allowed to access the responses
from the server, overriding same-origin security policies that by default forbid cross-origin
resource sharing. By transmitting HTTP headers in what is called a preflight request, CORS
checks that the server is cognizant of the user’s actions defined in the header.
1 header("Access -Control -Allow -Methods: GET");
2 header("Access -Control -Allow -Origin: dev1.qgg.hud.ac.uk");
3 header("Access -Control -Allow -Headers: API_KEY");
4 header("X-Frame -Options: deny");
5 header("X-XSS -Protection: 1; mode=block");
6 header("Content -Security -Policy: script -src https ://*. qgg.hud.ac.uk")
7 header("Strict -Transport -Security: max -age =86400");
8 header("X-Content -Type -Options: nosniff");
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9 header("Content -Type: application/json");
Code 3.11 Bearicade’s Response Headers Confirguration
Bearicade defines a dynamic Allowed Access Control Methods, Origin, and Headers from
the application’s request depending on the user and the action performed. As shown in
code 3.11 lines 1-3, the server will only allow a GET request made from dev1.qgg.hud.ac.uk
with a supplied API_KEY header key. Line 4 X-Frame-Options deny the browser from
rendering the content of the page in a frame element (e.g., frame, iframe, embed, or object);
this is a protection procedure to protect the users from falling into click-jacking attacks by
making sure the content is only accessible from the origin site. Line 5-6 is another attack
prevention feature that commands supported browsers to block a request if reflected cross-site
scripting (XSS) is detected. This feature is most useful for older browser complementing
the newer Content Security Policy implementation in browsers to allow scripts to be loaded
from the same domain. Line 7 Strict-Transport-Security ensures that the browser should
only access the page via HTTPS. Lines 8-9 deny applications Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) type sniffing and make sure that the application process responds as a
JSON document.
Security Misconfiguration and Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
Improper set up in security-related configurations in web applications and web servers may
result in opening up opportunities for attackers to exploit systems (Mendes et al., 2008). Also,
a large number of Internet-connected devices are using vulnerable components as part of
their system, allowing attackers to perform an automated large scale exploits (Cadariu et al.,
2015). Both of Security Misconfiguration and Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
are security concerns that could be found in different layers of a system, including web
servers, databases, frameworks, or libraries, among others.
From Bearicade’s configuration shown in 3.7, Bearicade was designed on a minimal platform
as suggested by OWASP (OWASP, 2017), consisting of 3 base components: (i) Caddy







Fig. 3.7 Bearicade’s Configuration
(Caddy, 2020) is used as the webserver of choice for bearicade because of it is minimalism
and security features (Cuppens, 2016) (ii) MySQL Database (iii) PHP FastCGI Process
Manager, all of these components are containerized by default to ensure supplemental isolation
and customizable during Bearicade’s installation. Secure configuration for each of these
components is followed respectively from the documentation of each component.
On top of the three base components, there are two components that form the web application
that is the server-side and the frontend layer. The server-side layer consists of PHP programs
that are compiled on the server. All libraries used in this layer are installed via a dependency
manager that defines the library and the version; this implementation is valid for continuously
inventorying the versions and checking for active vulnerabilities related to these dependencies.
The frontend consists of Javascript libraries, which are also continuously checked using
version scanners.
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) enables attackers to compromise a web page viewed by other
users by injecting client-side scripts. According to OWASP, This type of attack is found
64 Bearicade
in around two-thirds of all applications, endangering users by leading to stolen credentials,
session hijacking, or delivering malware.
In addition to the security precautions described in section (Header Configuration), there are
extra measurements to prevent XSS: (i) Bearicade uses Vue.js (Vue.js, 2020) as a progressive
Javascript framework, and by design, Vue.js escape HTML content (ii) automated API
to escape and sanitize content data sent and received (iii) performing scheduled system
scan using the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) standard to detect potential
vulnerabilities.
Insufficient Logging & Monitoring
With all the security implementations put in place to protect against OWASP top ten security
risks, attackers are still managing to intrude into the system by relying on insufficient logging,
monitoring, and timely response from the system maintainers. A 2017 report made by
Ponemon Institute (Ponemon Institute, 2017) shows that in 2016 data breach attacks took
on average 191 days to be identified and an average of 66 days to be contained, enough time
for attackers to cause harm to the system.
As described in section Data Acquisition, Bearicade collects a large amount of data from
the interaction with the system, resulting in leverage of potential monitoring and alert
mechanisms to be implemented in the system giving administrators a way of visualizing this
information through the dashboard. Use-cases of such mechanisms will be discussed and
proven further in the Artificial intelligence-based tools for secure access to HPC resources
chapter.
3.3.2 User Authentication
Bearicade uses a modified open-sourced PHP authentication class (PHPAuth, 2020); the class
was published in 2014 and currently has a large number of contributors, with undergoing
3.3 Security Implementations 65
development, auditing, and bug fixes, making it more reliable to be used when compared to
making an authentication class from scratch.
Email
Bearicade could be configured with a allow/deny-list to either accept or reject email addresses
belonging to specific domain names. For example, the University of Huddersfield are able to
accept email addresses with the *.hud.ac.uk prefix in order to allow individuals from the
institute. Moreover, there is an implementation to check an email address against a list of
disposable email address domains.
Password
Cryptographic hashing is a one-way function that takes a value as an input and generates
a fixed-length unique message digest, also known as a hash. Unlike traditional encryption
functions, which is a two-way function, hashing cannot be reversed, making it impossible to
generate the original input value (Ertaul et al., 2016).
According to a 2016 study, PBKDF2, Bcrypt, and Scrypt are hashing algorithms providing
the best security (Ertaul et al., 2016). Bearicade uses Bcrypt to hash passwords. Since it
was created in 1999 (Provos and Mazieres, 1999), Bcrypt is a memory hardening function,
making it CPU and RAM intensive as well as GPU resilient by design (Metla et al., 2018).
Some cryptographic hashing functions are vulnerable to rainbow tables attack. In a case of a
data leak, attackers would be able to compare the hashed values in the data and compare it
with a list of hashed common passwords (rainbow table) until a match is found. In order
to thwart such an attack, a unique generated value (salt) needs to be added to the input
while hashing; this function is called salting. Bearicade authentication system pulls a unique
16-byte salt from /dev/urandom for each password hashed.
Brute-force attacks are when an attacker attempts to guess the password by trying a random
combination of characters, or a database of commonly used passwords (dictionary attack),
this type of attacks could happen online on a live system or offline in case of a data leak. In
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order to prevent online attacks, Bearicade limits the number of login attempts to 5 attempts
per user; exceeding the limit will result in banning the offender. When it comes to offline
attacks, the current hashing function uses a "cost" parameter which is the power of two
number (2cost), stating the number of rounds to repeat the bcrypt function, resulting in an
exponential increase in the time taken to calculate the hash.
During registration, the users are required to input a password that needs to meet a specific
strength. Calculation of the strength made possible using pattern matching and minimum
entropy calculation, inputted password are pre-checked on the client-side then post-confirmed
on the server-side using zxcvbn which was developed by Dropbox (Wheeler, 2016).
Two-Factor Authentication
Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) is an essential step to authenticating users by defending
systems against account compromise (Reese et al., 2019). Bearicade is implemented with
Time-Based One-Time Password algorithm (TOTP) (Corp Pei Symantec J Rydell, 2011),
during authentication the user is required to present a One-Time Password (OTP), OTP
values are short-lived depending on the time factor. During registration, users are presented
with a random secret along with a Quick Response (QR) code. Users then can add the
secret/QR code to their prefered 2FA application. This process adds a verification to the
user’s authentication using a piece of hardware device they have, such as smart-phones. This
procedure was achieved using the TwoFactorAuth PHP library (Janssen, 2020).
3.4 Dashboard Features
This section will explore the graphical user interface of Bearicade (dashboard), where the
users can interact with the features implemented in the dashboard and access the clusters
configured. There are currently two versions of the dashboard, the first being for the
regular users giving them access to shell and file manager. The second version is for the
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administrators, which provides the same features as regular users with added functionality
to monitor and manage the system and its users.
Fig. 3.8 Bearicade Dashboard: Administrator Main View
Figure 3.8 shows a screenshot of administrators’ entry point on Bearicade’s dashboard. On
the main page, administrators are presented with (i) navigation bar (ii) basic statistics such
as number of registered users, recently failed logins, current active sessions, and online users
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(iii) terminal and file manager element (iv) geographical location of currently active sessions
(v) graph showing new users activity.
3.4.1 Terminal and File manager
The terminal and file manager element is the key feature of Bearicade’s dashboard presented
to both administrators and standard users. Upon initiating a connection by pressing the
connect button, the element will display the file manager GUI as shown in figure 3.9. The
GUI has three key features that are linked using icon illustrated buttons:
• Terminal and File manager toggle button, the button will allow the user to switch
between the terminal and file manager.
• Upload
Fig. 3.9 Bearicade Dashboard: File Manager
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File Editor
Using the file manager, the users can view the files on the local storage server along with
metadata such as file size and the ownership of the file. The user can click a file in order to
edit, and the element will show a file editor as shown in figure 3.10 and the user can make
changes and save or discard. The user could also choose one of the actions available for files,
such as download or delete the file. Clicking a folder would result in changing the directory
of the file manager.
Fig. 3.10 Bearicade Dashboard: File Editor
File Upload
Users are able to upload files conveniently from within the file manager using the upload
button, as demonstrated in figure 3.11 users are able to drag and drop or choose files wishing
to upload to the local cluster storage.
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Fig. 3.11 Bearicade Dashboard: File Upload
Server Selector
In the case of the University of Huddersfield’s QueensGate Grid, all the clusters use a single
network shared storage nodes, meaning that the file-manager is the same for the users on all
clusters. However, for the terminal, the users should be allowed to switch between different
clusters in order to submit jobs on different clusters on the grid. This could be done using the
server selector, which is integrated on the File-manager/terminal element on the dashboard
as shown in figure 3.12. Administrators are able to allow and deny users from accessing a
particular cluster within the configuration.
Fig. 3.12 Bearicade Dashboard: Server Selector
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3.4.2 Account Information and Customization
From within the dashboard, the users are able to view and update limited information
regarding their account via the sidebar as shown in figure 3.13; this information includes Full
name, Email address, and the 2FA Secret along with the QR code. Providing the user with
visual customization, there is a toggle implemented in Bearicade’s dashboard for the user to
be able to switch between dark and light theme as shown in figure 3.14. The dashboard is
set to the dark theme by default; however, user’s preference will be saved on their browser
via a cookie.
Fig. 3.13 Bearicade Dashboard: User Details
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Fig. 3.14 Bearicade Dashboard: Light Theme
3.4.3 Users Management
Bearicade’s Users Management is dedicated to the administrators. This section will cover
most of the Bearicades user interface’s functionalities part of the users’ management. The
part of the user interface shown in figure 3.15 demonstrates users’ main page. The page has
a list of all users registered on Bearicade. Through the list, administrators are able to view
the users’ full name, username, and email, administrators, are also able to search via this
information.
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Fig. 3.15 Bearicade Dashboard: Users List
User Details and Actions
Through the users lists, administrators are able to view and control different actions per user,
as shown in figure 3.16, details about the user are available such as (i) Identification number
(ii) Time since last active (iii) Groups (iv) Joining Date (v) Time-based one time password
secret (vi) futher details will be discussed in the following sections. In addition, actions
available are (i) Acivating/de-activating (Lock/Unlock) accounts (ii) Removing System User
from systems with or without the user’s system files (iii) Deleting Bearicade accounts.
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Fig. 3.16 Bearicade Dashboard: Users Details
User Activity and Monitoring
Users activity is essential for continuously track and prevent potential security risk along
with diagnosing possible issues. Bearicade provides a range of data visualization elements.
As shown in figure 3.17, these elements are divided into 3 sections (i) Browser Records
(ii) Interaction Activities (iii) Login History. The data in each of these elements are described
in details in section Data Acquisition.
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Fig. 3.17 Bearicade Dashboard: Users Monitoring
Subsequent to each successful login, Bearicade records information regarding the user’s
browser and device as shown in figure 3.22 such as: (i) IP address (ii) Timestamp (iii) Fre-
quency of the unique record. (iv) device fingerprint (v) cookies (vi) languages (vii) browser
and user-agent (viii) platform (ix) screen-size (x) referrer. Along with this information,
Bearicade logs the number of failed login attempts as shown in figure 3.20.
As shown in figure 3.19, the last element of the activity elements provides information about
the user’s interaction with the system, such as the use of the terminal and file-manager. This
information include the timestamp of the activity, type of the activity, action attempted,
system targeted, and the result of the activity.
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Fig. 3.18 Bearicade Dashboard: Users Browser Records
Fig. 3.19 Bearicade Dashboard: Users Activity
3.4 Dashboard Features 77
Fig. 3.20 Bearicade Dashboard: User Login Attempts
3.4.4 Settings
The settings section provides the possibility of changing the system and Bearicade’s settings
from the browser; these settings are divided into six sections:
1. Site: availability to change site name, base URL, administrator email, and other basic
settings.
2. Security: settings provide the ability to quickly modifying security settings such as
attach mitigation time and attempts before ban.
3. SMTP: Secure Mail Transport Protocol (e-Mailing) settings.
4. Cookies: Modifying cookies parameters stored in users’ browsers.
5. Logs: logs path to be collected and visualised on Bearicade.
6. Server: Web server configuration settings.
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Fig. 3.21 Bearicade Dashboard: Security Settings
Fig. 3.22 Bearicade Dashboard: Servers Settings
3.5 Summary
Bearicade is a users and security management gateway framework for distributed systems,
permitting users to remotely access multiple nodes on/off-premise, providing a web terminal
and file-manager implementation. Built on a restful API, Bearicade allows administrators
to visualise data. Most importantly, Bearicade enables machine learning implementation to
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help to enhance security from the data collected.
In order to evaluate the performance of the Bearicade framework in typical scenarios relevant
to secure access to the HPC systems, a number of experiments were conducted on the QGG





The University of Huddersfield’s HPC services campus grid is known as QueensGate Grid.
Students, researchers, and staff make up a diverse group of users on the grid. Users come
from various departments such as Sciences, Engineering, and Business, which means the
grid must be suitable for a wide range of use cases, including DL-Poly, OpenFoam, Ansys,
Matlab, Maxwell, Fluent, and COMSOL, to name a few.
4.1.1 Systems Distribution
At the time of writing, the University of Huddersfield’s QueensGate Grid HPC systems
consists of 4 Clusters, all of which are geographically apart.
At the University of Huddersfield, there are three main High-Performance Computing systems
distributed around the campus. As shown in figure 4.1, there are two central locations for
HPC systems. Data Centre is the first one, which holds:
• Cygnus, which is a cluster, consists of 9 nodes, each with 24 cores Intel Xeon X5690
CPU clocked at 3.47GHz, and 200 Gigabyte of memory.
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Fig. 4.1 HPC Systems Distribution at the University of Huddersfield
Fig. 4.2 HPC Systems Architecture in the University of Huddersfield QGG
• Bellatrix, which is the chief node for controlling and managing all the connections to
all clusters and nodes. It has a major part in the proposed framework.
• Orion is a cluster used for scientific research; it was not used to gather data for the
experiments.
The other location in the QGG campus grid - HPC centre houses:
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• Eridani, a 35 nodes cluster each node has 8 cores Intel i5 clocked at 3.2GHz, and 8
Gigabyte of memory.
• Condor, which is a high-throughput computing software framework for Windows and
it runs on over 300 windows computers distributed around campus. The head node,
however, is located in the HPC Centre.
Each one of the head nodes for each of the clusters is connected together via the University’s
network (HPC VLAN and DC1 VLAN). The clusters’ nodes are connected via a private
network without being accessible via the University’s VLAN.
4.1.2 Access Software at the University of Huddersfield
Predecessor Access Software
Like many of the HPC systems around the world, the previous access setup at the University
of Huddersfield in order to access the various systems of the grid was a Linux based node that
is setup with Secure Shell (SSH). The node was set up to be accessed externally by exposing
the SSH port externally. By logging in to SSH, the users could then access all head nodes
from the terminal. For a new user to be registered in the system, system administrators have
to create a local user and generate a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) set of keys and the
local users along with the home folder is then synced with the rest of the nodes in the grid.
The newly registered user should then receive their private key via email.
Current Access Software
At the University of Huddersfield, and since 2018, Bearicade has been the main access
software for QueensGate Grid. Bearicade allows users to access all clusters at QueensGate
Grid described in Systems Distribution remotely.
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4.1.3 HPC User Access and Privileges
The predecessor access software (SSH) at the University of Huddersfield has only allowed
two types of users to access the system, a user and an administrator. This method did not
provide enough security metrics such as data about the users’ behaviour, data visualization,
and alerts.
Bearicade has introduced new and more customizable privileges. This section will introduce
three categories of users in Bearicade at the University of Huddersfield.
Researchers and Students Users
For every academic year, the University of Huddersfield’s researchers and students request
access to use QGG. Approved users will have access to the head node of each of the clusters
they are permitted to. From within the dashboard, the students have the ability to access the
basic functionality of Bearicade, such as (i) File-manager (ii) Terminal (iii) List of clusters
Enrolled masters and undergraduate students to the Parallel Computer Architectures Cluster,
Grids and Cloud Computing module are assigned weekly activities that they are required
to perform on the QueensGate Grid clusters. In order to achieve these tasks, the users are
required to login to Bearicade and interact with the systems from within the dashboard.
This means that the users will log in to Bearicade multiple times every week throughout the
academic year from unique devices, different times and perform different actions.
Other researchers such as Ph.D/Masters students and academic staff can have access to the
system to submit jobs and perform other tasks on the system.
These users are the main source for the data collected by Bearicade. The data could then be
used to train machine learning models in order to have an understanding of the patterns of
the users’ activities.
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Administrators
In order to manage the systems, support users, and monitor activities of the systems,
QueensGate Grid administrators are logging in to Bearicade as an administrative account to
be able to activate and deactivate user accounts, continuously monitor request and activity
logs, and diagnose problems and giving support to the users of the system.
Bearicade administrators have multiple functionalities and features from within the dashboard
as shown in table 4.1.























Bearicade gives researchers the ability to access the data generated by Bearicade from the
API, allowing them to investigate the data systematically research in order to establish novel
findings in multiple fields, especially security. Developers also benefit from this functionality
by developing various software and plugins such as visualisation application and machine
learning models, which could be implemented in the core of Bearicade or as a third-party
application for the users.
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4.2 Data Collection
In order to collect data, this system was ready to have most of the core usage functionality
and was set up to be used in the University of Huddersfield for final year undergraduate
students and master students for the two modules: Parallel Computer Architecture Clusters
and Grids, and Parallel Computer Architectures Cluster and Cloud Computing.
The students from both modules had to use the system as part of their module assignment;
in order for the students to have access to the system, these are the steps followed:
1. Register for an account via the system registration page.
2. Once approved by system administrators, students would log in to the system.
3. Create job files.
4. submits HPC jobs to Cygnus and Condor.
The students can submit different types of jobs. However they are provided with templates
for some parallel programs/jobs such as: (i) hello-world (ii) calculating PI (iii) matrix-matrix
product (iv) matrix-vector product. Code 4.1, shows example of an uncompiled hello-world
MPI C program. Code 4.2, shows the PBS job file used to run a compiled C code.
1 #include <stdio.h>
2 #include "mpi. h
3 int main(int argc , char ** argv) {
4 int rank , size;
5 MPI_Init( & argc , & argv);
6 MPI_Comm_size(MPI_COMM_WORLD , & size);
7 MPI_Comm_rank(MPI_COMM_WORLD , & rank);




Code 4.1 Example of Hello-World MPI C program
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1 #!/ bin/bash
2 #PBS -N mpi_job
3 #PBS -l walltime=01:00:00
4 #PBS -q queue_name
5 #PBS -l select=2:ncpus=36:mpiprocs=36
6
7 mpirun ./hello -world
Code 4.2 Example of PBS job file
Steps 2-4 were repeated multiple time by the students throughout the year from different
devices, locations, and browsers. Students had experienced most functions within the system,
and data was logged from every activity.
4.3 Flexibility: Cloud Deployment
Bearicade includes Ansible playbooks that automates the deployment of a complete Bearicade
stack on a variable-sized cluster, as explained in the deployment section of the Bearicade
chapter. The following configuration allows Bearicade to be easily deployed in the cloud, such
as a virtual cluster or on a bare-metal cluster. This feature has come with many advantages,
as will be described below.
Deployment on the cloud has helped developers, researchers and students to work on projects
and assignments by running their own instance of the Bearicade stack on a cloud provider
such as Google cloud platform (GCP), Amazon Web Services (AWS), and Microsoft Azure.
4.4 Bearicade Performance Evaluation in The Pandemic
During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, nation-wide University campuses were shut; this
made it difficult to manage and maintain the traditional cluster and thus making the
preparation of the cluster for teaching a prolonged process. Research projects have also
been impacted by the pandemic. Adding to all that, during the same year, there were
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attacks that targeted HPC centres around the United Kingdom. All of the factors above has
brought a number of HPC clusters to a halt. Fortunately for the University of Huddersfield,
running Bearicade has enabled the users of the HPC clusters to be able to continue the work
remotely without an interruption through the web dashboard. Administrators were able to
continue monitoring and managing the systems through the equipped dashboard explained
in section Dashboard Features and in case of system malfunctions, Bearicade’s containerized
architecture allow administrators to redeploy and reconfigure the systems easily.
4.5 System Usability: SSH vs Bearicade
As explained in this chapter, some of the University of Huddersfield students have been
using Bearicade as their primary access gateway to QGG HPC resources. The students have
also used the traditional method (SSH) to access their hand-built system as part of their
coursework. This teaching delivery method gives the possibility for assessing the usability of
Bearicade compared to SSH to determine how simple the system is to use and satisfaction and
user attitudes toward the system. Therefore an assessment methodology is needed. System
Usability Scale (SUS) (Brooke, 1995) has been used in order to measure these aspects.
Table 4.2 System Usability Scale Score for SSH and Bearicade
SSH Bearicade
Number of Users 37 12
Average SUS Score 53.8 64.0
The SUS score is a value between 0 and 100, demonstrating the system’s usability; the
higher the value, the better the usability. The same users were given a survey containing ten
questions about each of the systems. Table 4.2 shows the average SUS score for each of the
surveys. Bearicade survey involved 12 users scoring an average SUS score of 64.0, and SSH
users involved 37 users with an average SUS score of 53.8.
It is evident from the result that students preferred Bearicade over SSH. In addition, the




This chapter has provided detailed information on how Bearicade was deployed at the
University of Huddersfield QueensGate Grid. The deployment allowed the users to use
Bearicade as the only gateway for HPC resources, in addition, administrators managed the
systems and users from within Bearicade. This has allowed Bearicade to prove it’s usability
from the users’ perspective and ease the collection of data from different sources within
Bearicade to enable the expansion of the security systems via Artificial Intelligence.
The next chapter will explore different AI model implementations using Bearicade. In order
for these implementations to work, AI models require data to be trained and evaluated with.

Chapter 5
Artificial intelligence-based tools for
secure access to HPC resources
Bearicade is a novel data-driven framework designed, developed, and implemented as part
of this research. All of the users’ data that Bearicade collects are from web elements. The
gateway to access the distributed systems is through Bearicade’s web dashboard. In addition,
every interaction with these systems is authorized and recorded by Bearicade.
A secure artificial intelligent system would be able to use Bearicade’s capabilities in data
collection and existing data inventory. Thus, make decisions at any point of the users’
interactions with the systems to detect and deal with anomalies and enhance detection
accuracy.
This chapter will explore the possibilities of implementing Artificial Intelligent techniques
using the data gathered via Bearicade based on the system view and the user view. Each
of the sections below will discuss different implementations of Machine Learning models
developed over the past four years.
Section Initial Model Algorithm Design below will discuss some of the initial model designs
implemented that has were not very effective; their refinement led to the successful model
designs. Section Anomaly detection of user behaviour on Bearicade’s login page and Classi-
fication of Malicious Linux Terminal Commands are based on a paper published (Al-Jody
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et al., 2020) that uses the data generated from Bearicade to build two different models per
system that could identify anomalies in users’ behaviour. Finally, section Model Per User
For System will explain a different model design that could predict the users’ authenticity.
Different model will have different evaluation model. However, models should be evaluated
using an appropriate evaluation methodology using trained and untrained data, including
data generated from a real-world examples.
5.1 Using Bearicade
Over 26 months with the current deployment of Bearicade on the QueensGate Grid with
over 120 registered users, Bearicade has received over 4700 authorization attempts, 1400 of
which were granted. As explained in Chapter 3, Bearicade collects information about the
user from multiple sources; thus, the information collected over two years from 1400 sessions
is large enough to build Artificial Intelligence solutions to detect anomalies. Table 5.1 shows
aggregate information for QueensGate Grid users’ Behaviour on Bearicade, including the
Average, minimum and maximum for some of the parameters that will be used to identify
users in this section.


















Average 2 5 3 91 204 81 40
Minimum 1 1 1 2 1 3 2
Maximum 9 103 48 323 743 753 670
A typical work-flow of a user executing a command on the end systems via Bearicade would
consist of 3 steps: (i) Authorizing the user (ii) Logging the activity of the user (iii) Sending
the command to the end system to be executed. Figure 5.1 shows a possible AI integration
for this work-flow above on Bearicade. The figure broadly explains the users’ interaction
with Bearicade in order for them to execute commands on the end system, such as an
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HPC cluster. Grey elements represent the core components of Bearicade, while the green
represents the suggested AI components to be implemented. Decision A would process the
users’ information and make a decision before authorizing the user to the system. Decision
B could process the command sent to the system and make a decision before executing it on
the end system. The figure does not represent the only possible integration of AI components.








Fig. 5.1 Viable AI integration for Bearicade’s components
5.1.1 Data Preparation
Although every Machine Learning models is different from the other, the approach for
accessing and using the data will be remarkably similar. This section will focus on how
the data collected and generated by Bearicade will be accessed, prepared, structured, and
imported for use in the different Artificial Intelligent solutions.
All of the Artificial intelligence model implementations for Bearicade are developed with
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the real data from The University of Huddersfield QueensGate Grid (QGG) main Bearicade
instance. Some private instances of Bearicade were deployed to perform certain tests.
User Authentication
To have access to the data from Bearicade, developers can access such data from the pre-
defined Representational State Transfer Application Programming Interface (RESTful API)
actions. Developers could reach the RESTful API actions via the end-point address. In the
case of QGG, its RESTful API address would be https://qgg.hud.ac.uk/controller/api.php.
As discussed in section 3.2.6, with administrators’ ability to assign API access keys to every
developer wanting to access the RESTful API, developers were given access to specific actions
required through the end-point for development.
Information Collection and Anonymization
As a developer request an API, an API key with zero permission will be issued to the
developer. Administrators could then assign one or more actions permissions to the key as
described in section 3.2.6.
Although the actions described in section 3.2.6 cover most of the database’s information
collections, administrators could also set up their own actions as permission to the developers.
This is advantageous, as administrators could prevent users’ sensitive information from being
passed through the RESTful API. In other words, users’ personal sensitive information will
be anonymised, and only the required data will be passed.
Data Structuration and Importation
As explained in section 3.2.6, Bearicade uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as its
default transporting format for the RESTful API output data. This allows cross-language
compatibility in gathering the data from Bearicade’s RESTful API. Below are snippets codes
demonstrating the ease in gathering the data from Bearicade’s RESTful API.
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1 curl --request GET \
2 --url ’https :// qgg.hud.ac.uk/controller/api.php?a=listUsers ’ \
3 --header ’api_key: my_key ’ --header ’content -type: application/json’
Code 5.1 Sample API Request in Bash
1 import requests
2 url = "https ://qgg.hud.ac.uk/controller/api.php"
3 querystring = {"a":"listUsers"}
4 payload = ""
5 headers = {
6 ’api_key ’: "my_key",
7 ’content -type’: "application/json"
8 }
9 response = requests.request("GET", url , data=payload , headers=headers ,
params=querystring)
Code 5.2 Sample API Request in Python








Code 5.3 Sample API Request in Javascript
1 CURL *hnd = curl_easy_init ();
2 curl_easy_setopt(hnd , CURLOPT_CUSTOMREQUEST , "GET");
3 curl_easy_setopt(hnd , CURLOPT_URL , "https :// qgg.hud.ac.uk/controller/api.
php?a=listUsers");
4 struct curl_slist *headers = NULL;
5 headers = curl_slist_append(headers , "api_key: my_key");
6 headers = curl_slist_append(headers , "content -type: application/json");
7 curl_easy_setopt(hnd , CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER , headers);
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8 CURLcode ret = curl_easy_perform(hnd);
Code 5.4 Sample API Request in C
5.1.2 Models Perquisites
The next chapter will explore Artificial Intelligence implementations using Bearicade’s
data. These implementations will require perquisites such as Artificial Intelligence libraries.
Two main Artificial Intelligence libraries were used in these experiments. Undoubtedly,
each implementation will have more unique perquisites; however, that will depend on the
experiment.
Brain.js
Brain.js is an open-source Neural Network Library written in Javascript. Brain.js is highly
customisable, meaning Neural Network could be tweaked to match desired accuracy (BrainJS,
2016). A great benefit of using brain.js is that all prediction could be calculated and run
from the browser once the model has been trained.
Brain.js could also run server-sided through node js (Teixeira, 2012). Brain.js provides different
types of Neural Networks, such as Feedforward Neural Network with backpropagation (w/o
GPU), Time Step Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), Time Step Long Short Term Memory
Neural Network (LSTM), and Time Step Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU).
TensorFlow.js
TensorFlow.js is another open-source Web Graphics Library (WebGL) accelerated Javascript
library for building Machine Learning models. Being part of the TensorFlow ecosystem,
models built are cross-compatible between languages such as Javascript and Python.
Like Brain.js, TensorFlow.js allows models to run through any Javascript runtime engine
(Browser, NodeJS, Deno).
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5.2 Initial Model Algorithm Design
Over the past four years and throughout the development of Bearicade and its Machine
learning model, there have been many attempts to build a generation of models that could
help identify anomalies in the system. Most of these attempts were unsuccessful or required
improvements. However, the lessons learned from these designs led to building the current
working model algorithms.
This section will briefly cover some of these attempts, going over the methods used to build
the models and the results of these models.
5.2.1 Model Per System For Users
The Idea of a Model per System for Users algorithm is to have a model that could be trained
with all users’ data and able to identify which user is accessing the system depending on the
login data passed. If a user not within the organization tries to access Bearicade, the model
should be able to identify such an anomaly.
Data
Over four months, from the first release of the system, on January 19 with 50 student users
of the system, a considerably large amount of data has been generated.
During the system’s operation, the server has received 2030 login attempts, 536 of which are
granted.
User’s Login data are formatted as such:
Table 5.2 Users Login Example Row
User ID Timestamp fails IP Fingerprint Reason
1 2017-11-07 07:00:26 1 0.0.0.0 859de64fe9... Invalid Authentication Code
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As previously declared in the Data Acquisition section, more data are gathered about the
user from different sources. This data would be used later to improve the AI-based tools in
Bearicade.
Another vital table to be used in the AI tools is the Users Activity. There has been a total of
16672 activity executed on the system, with an average of 340 activity per user. An activity
would look like the table below.
Table 5.3 Users Activity Example Row
Activity User Type Attempt Flag Success
1 1 Terminal Command:"cd /home/root/; ls" Path Manipulation false
Data Preparation
Many of the Machine Learning algorithms do not accept categorical data as it is an efficiency
limitation rather than the difficulty of implementation within the algorithms themselves.
Categorical data are data with labels such as the key: Operating system, and its values:
Windows, or Mac. These values are usually called nominal data.
Nominal Data should be converted into numerical data before feeding it to the ML algorithm.
There are various ways to form the data gathered to the Machine learning algorithm to train
it. Two of the most popular ways to convert the data are:
1. Label Encoding.
2. One-Hot Encoding.
Label encoding, also known as Integer Encoding, is a process of converting values into
numerical values. For example, Windows becomes 1, Mac becomes 2, and Linux becomes 3.
This encoding method has a natural ordered relationship between its values, and ML might
be trained to understand this relationship.
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One-Hot encoding is used when there is no natural order relationship between values, and
different values might be shared with different labels. An example of using this type of
encoding would be when we have different users using multiple operating systems, then a
matrix-like table could be generated:
Table 5.4 One-hot encoding
User ID / OS Windows Mac Linux Encoded Output
1 0 1 1 0, 1, 1
2 1 0 0 1, 0, 0
3 0 0 1 0, 0, 1
Model





Upon initialisation of the model, the system request up to data from the database. A JSON




4 "fingerprint": "bdd8d1aea7db15f2ec","4d35856e31c95dc9cc4", ... ],




Code 5.5 raw training data
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To develop the one-hot encoding method, index dictionaries for the IP, fingerprint, and
timestamp were created. These dictionaries are just arrays with a unique value in every
index.
Brain JS requires a special format for the data to be trained; this format should be an object
with two more objects inside (input, being the inputted data, and output, being the expected
output). The system, therefore, generates a formed training data that is still unserialized,










Code 5.6 unserialized training data
As it is not acceptable to have an object in the input field, therefore as a final step, the
system uses the dictionaries made formerly to encode the data and separate IP, fingerprint,
and timestamp from each other for every user. The encoded concatenated data in the input
array and the output array consists of the user id inside an array as shown in code 5.7.
1 {
2 1: {




Code 5.7 serialized training data for user 1 to predict only IP
Three identical neural networks have been set up in figure 5.2 for the three values (IP,
fingerprint, time). The neural networks were all configured using the following parameters:
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Fig. 5.2 Neural Network
Learning rate controls the speed of training the higher, the faster (0 to 1). Faster training
might cause constraints on training results, causing new training to overfit. Similar to the
learning rate, momentum is only multiplied by the next level’s change value.
The network training might stop if the training error has gone below the threshold or the
maximum number of iteration has been reached.
Training
After formatting the prepared data, the data was fed to the network to be used in training.
However, feeding 150 data sets (3 variables x 50 students) would not be enough to increase
the accuracy of the network.
The network had to be trained with random data from the training data set. Therefore, a
function was created to generate genuine login data (IP, fingerprint, and time).
The network was then trained with one million genuine data records; after every 100 record
was training, the accuracy of the model was calculated.
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Fig. 5.3 Training ML with a Million Records
Results
Representing the accuracy as percentage in the y-axis and training records number in the
x-axis, figure 5.3 shows the result from the training. The result has shown that the average
accuracy of the network over 1 million records trained was 53.8%, with a peak accuracy of
86.2%.
Conclusion
The network was only trained with three variable with no relationship between the variable.
Also, the records did not include disingenuous data. Moreover, Neural Networks configurations
were not altered. These factors play a significant role in lowering the accuracy as the system
cannot identify rogue records. Based on the outcomes of this approach, it was decided to
develop a "Model per User" AI-based tool.
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5.2.2 Precursory Model Per User Algorithm
There have been different approaches developed to get to the successful model discussed in
section Model Per User For System. These approaches were not efficient nor successful in
building an accurate model. Below are some of the algorithms that were attempted:
1. One-hot encoding: the successor model has used label encoding to encode the raw
data before training the model by converting each value to a unique integer. One-hot
encoding has been used; however, the training error was high due to the noise caused
by the large binary values.
2. Model Per Information Per User: the successor model has encoded all the information
shown in table 5.7 into a single object before training the model. Model Per Information
Per User Algorithm has used an independent model per information. The idea was to
multiply the results from each model by an independent weight then sum the results in
order to get an accurate value. Although such implementation has provided the ability
to control the importance of an information factor over the other, there was not much
variety in the data in order to form a reliable prediction.
5.3 Classification of Malicious Linux Terminal Commands
5.3.1 Introduction
In any distributed systems, terminal languages such as bash are usually the link between the
users and the local systems. Once a malicious user has managed to get access to Bearicade’s
dashboard or any shell access gateway by impersonating a user, the attacker would be able
to communicate to the local systems and may cause harm to the local systems or other users.
This experiment aims to build an effective artificial intelligent method for analysing users’
commands sent to the local systems and detect malicious commands. As shown in figure
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5.1, this implementation would be part of decision B. The commands sent are analysed and
given a score of suspicion before getting executed in the local systems.
5.3.2 Data
As explained in section 3.2.5, activities of the users’ interaction with the local system are
recorded before getting sent to the server. The information collected shown in table 3.3
includes the following:
1. User ID: Identification number for the user executing a command.
2. Date: Date and time of the activity recorded.
3. Component: Which component the user is interacting with, i.e. (File Manager,
Terminal, System).
4. Local System: The local system the user is interacting with.
5. Command: The command or activity the user has attempted.
In a typical HPC environment, user commands are often limited to (i) interaction with the
user’s file system located at the user’s home directory, e.g. (editing, creating, or removing
files) (ii) interacting with the user’s Jobs, e.g. (submitting, removing, querying status).
(iii) interacting with certain applications. The following limitation makes it possible to detect
and block commands that do not fit within these HPC environment limitations.
Data Preperation
At the time of doing the following experiment, Bearicade has recorded over 30,000 activities
from the users. The data were filtered to exclude commands that are out of the HPC
environment scope discussed above.
In order to create the dataset used for training, the filtered data were used to generate a
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Using the calculation above, the occurrences of a complete command (c) sent to the server
would be calculated word by word. The probability of suspicion (P (c)) for the complete








5.3.3 Training & Evaluation
Using TensorFlow, a Convolutional Neural Network model was configured with an input
layer size that would match the training dataset’s input dimensions and an output layer size
of 2 to match the Neutral and Suspicious predictions. Several hyperparameters varieties were
tested to reach an optimal accuracy with a large number of different commands.
Subsequent to training the model, test commands were produced to test the accuracy of
the model. As shown in table 5.5, the commands tested included typical ordinary HPC
user actions such as interactions with personal files or job submission (C, D, E, F); other
commands included modifying file systems (A, B).
Table 5.5 Classification results of Linux commands (Al-Jody et al., 2020)
Command Expected Neutral Suspicious
A sudo rm -rf / Suspicious 6.76% 93.24%
B apt install python3 Suspicious 1.68% 98.32%
C qsub helloworld.job Neutral 99.99% 0.01%
D cd .. Neutral 97.56% 2.44%
E rm ./hello Neutral 96.52% 3.48%
F rm -rf ./hello Neutral 76.95% 23.05%
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The results from the table 5.5 demonstrate the model’s success from the high accuracy of
this model. The model successfully identified different commands with different expected
outcomes. This model is efficient for use in a real-world scenario where the users’ commands
are tested before being passed to the designated server. This approach, however, does
not analyse commands that run from a script file or any executable example. To mitigate
this issue, a number of different approaches could be done, such as (i) Enforce a policy to
disable script execution (ii) Examine script files step by step before executing them.. At
the University of Huddersfield QGG, script file executions are disabled by default. However,
analysing script files would be considered a more viable approach.
5.4 Anomaly detection of user behaviour on Bearicade’s login
page
5.4.1 Introduction
The number of impersonation attacks on authentication systems has been increasing. The
authentication layer of any system is the most crucial layer of all the system. Once an
impersonation attack has been executed, the impersonated individual has lost all their privacy
on the targeted system at that moment. In order to prevent such impersonation attacks,
a profile regarding the legitimate user’s behaviour should be collected and analysed and
collected.
The idea of this experiment is to collect users’ behaviour when accessing the system. By
training a Machine Learning model to detect such behaviour, the model would be able to
detect automated types of impersonation.
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5.4.2 Data
Bearicade database contains a large collection of information regarding each of its user’s
behavioural data as explained in section 3.2.5. The data collection that represents unique
behavioural characteristics for each user will be the following information:
1. Browser User Information: Details about the browser, such as the user agent.
2. Time: time spent on the page.
3. Mouse Clicks: click count along with the click details such as the timestamp of the
click and X and Y coordinates for each click.
4. Mouse Movements: Includes the timestamp and the X and Y of the movement destina-
tion.
In order to analyse the data, some visualisation had to be setup. A heatmap of Bearicade’s
login page with the clicks and movements of a user was the best option to visualise such
information. As shown in figure 5.4, the heatmap represent a random legitimate user accessing
QueensGate Grid system via Bearicade’s login page.
Fig. 5.4 Mouse events heatmap of a random user accessing Bearicade’s login page
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A number of random user’s heatmap were analysed visually and found that the majority of
users mouse movement were very similar, noting that the minimum, maximum, and average
were within close proximity. This could reduce the accuracy of the Neural Network’s model
if no more features were added to the model.
5.4.3 Training & Evaluation
The dataset that was pulled from Bearicade was treated as a neutral dataset for training.
Emulated suspicious data were generated to match logins from bots and additional irregular-
ities. The size of both sources matched to keep a fair bias in training.
Feed-forward Neural Network using Brain.js were configured with an input layer to match the
input size, along with an output layer that matches the normal and suspicious predictions.
A number of hyperparameters were tested until an optimal output was reached.
Table 5.6 Classification Results of User Behaviour (Al-Jody et al., 2020)
Test Case Expected Output Normal % suspicious %
A Neutral 99.72% 0.28%
B Suspicious 2.74% 97.26%
C Neutral 91.34% 8.66%
D Neutral 99.79% 0.21%
E Suspicious 1.81% 98.19%
The trained model was tested with different test cases from both outsides and within the
training dataset. As shown in table 5.6, test case (A and B) were from within the training
dataset, while test case (C) was through a generated random input, (D) through Neutral
human input, (E) programmable suspicious input. The accuracy of the model was high for
all 5 test cases.
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5.5 Model Per User For System
5.5.1 Introduction
There are many features that could be analysed from the user’s behaviour that would allow
a system to estimate the probability of the user’s authenticity. The purpose of this work is
to build a Neural Network model for each user of the system to calculate the probability of
the users’ authenticity from different parameters passed. Such implementation would fall in
Decision A as shown in figure 5.1.
5.5.2 Data
As discussed in the section above, the different parameters that would be passed to the model
would include the following information shown in table 5.7.
Table 5.7 Users Login Example Row
Information Examples Details
Timestamp 2021-02-02 15:14:11 Time and date of attempt
Geographical Location United Kingdom Geographical Location from IP Address
Operating System Mac OS Operating System of current Attempt
Platform MacIntel Device Platform used in Attempt
Screen Size 1920x1080 Screen Resolution of the Device
Browser Chrome Browser used in attempt
Each set of this information represents unique features that could identify a particular
user on a Bearicade. Each of the users on QueensGate Grid Bearicade logs into Bearicade
using different parameters shown in 5.7, graph 5.5 illustrate the data distribution between
Bearicade users showing device used (Version), Geographical Location (via IP), and screen
size. The graph shows a more consistent parameter distribution when compared to the other
parameters.
Table 5.1 shows that on average, a Bearicade user authenticates to Bearicade 40 times, and
the account is used on average over 81 days per user. Also, users use two unique screen sizes,
five different IP addresses, and three different devices used to login to Bearicade.
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Fig. 5.5 Unique data distribution between users
Data Preparation
As the data gets requested from the Application Programmable Interface (API), a JSON
array of objects gets parsed, forming the raw data for a particular user, which is required to
train the NN model.
A sample of one of the objects in the array is shown in 5.8. However, this model will only
use four keys in the object, which will be (i) timestamp (ii) browser version (User Agent)
(iii) browser IP (iv) screen size.
1 {
2 "id": "1",
3 "timestamp": "2021-02-02 04:14:11",
4 "browserCookies": "authID=e8f7dc63331e43151c1d379ba343052737728b01",
5 "browserLanguage": "en -US",
6 "browserName": "Netscape",
7 "browserPlatform": "MacIntel",
8 "browserVersion": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 11_1_0)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.67 Safari/537.36
",
9 "browserIP": "92.xx.xx.xx",
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10 "historyLength": "3",
11 "javaEnabled": "0",





Code 5.8 Raw User Browser Data
Such data shown in 5.8 will require to be encoded before training the Neural network. The
process of information encoding will be explained in the following sections.
Time-Stamp (Date and Time)
The timestamp is the date and time a user has logged in, and the information has been
recorded. Time and the day of login could form unique identifiable information to help
recognise user’s habit of using the system throughout the days and time of the week. Since
date and time is a piece of historical information, only the time (Hour) and the day of the
week will be extracted from the timestamp.
The data will then be used to form a matrix with 24 columns to represent the time of the day
and seven rows to represent the day of the week. An encoding function would be passed the
timestamp and return the location of the time and date in the matrix. Figure 5.6, shows a
heat-map visualized matrix for a random user. By visually analysing the heat-map, multiple
features could be extracted. For example, the user does not have the same frequency of login
during Saturday and Sunday compared to the rest of the weekdays. Also, the user has a
certain time range during weekday where the user logs in.
Geographical Location
Over 95% of QueensGate Grid users have used Bearicade from within Great Britain only.
However, some users tend to access Bearicade from outside Great Britain. Thus, the country
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Fig. 5.6 Timestamp Matrix Heat-map visualization
a user trying to authenticate from should be considered in determining the user’s legitimacy.
The only way Bearicade could determine the geographical location of the location is through
the IP address of the user. Bearicade uses an IP lookup database that is used to determine
the country of origin of the IP address. As shown in 5.9 Bearicade also uses an object
containing a list of all 240 countries with IP address allocations sorted by distance from











Code 5.9 Countries List with IP addresses allocations sorted by distance from GB
Screen Size, Operating System, Platform, and Browser
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When a user logs in to Bearicade, the Screen Size, Operating System, Platform, and Browser
are often linked together, representing the devices a user is logging in from. This could have
a substantial positive influence on the accuracy of the model.
The Screen size and platform are gathered directly from the user’s browser along with the
user agent, which might look something like 5.10, the user agent is parsed to give details
about the operating system and the browser the user is using.
1 Mozilla /5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 11_1_0) AppleWebKit /537.36 (KHTML
, like Gecko) Chrome /87.0.4280.67 Safari /537.36
Code 5.10 User Agent Example
All of this information is encoded similarly. Using a label encoding method, a dictionary is
created with the possible information varieties turning the information into a unique number
representing the information. In case a new variety is not presented in the dictionary, it gets
added to the dictionary then encoded through the same method.
Anomaly Data
All the methods above are used to prepare genuine data for model training; the model
requires anomaly data in order to be able to differentiate between what is considered to be
safe or not. Since the system does not have enough unsafe data, a method of generating
anomaly data is required for the training process.
Generating such data is done using the dictionaries generated as explained in Data Preparation.
However, anomaly data should not consist of elements a user has used before, which would
be considered safe. Thus while preparing the genuine data, an array of safe elements would
be recorded; elements in this array would then be eliminated from the main dictionary to
create a new dictionary for generating anomaly data.
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5.5.3 Training the Model
As the dataset has been compiled from the steps explained above, the next process is to
train the model with datasets generated.
Model Validation
A model validation techniques need to be used in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the
model, especially on new data that the model has not been trained with before.
Fig. 5.7 5-fold cross validation sets
Cross-Validation is a statistical method that was used to test the accuracy of this model.
Cross-Validation takes a k-fold parameter which is the number of groups that the dataset
will be split into. Figure 5.7 shows 5-fold cross-validation, which duplicates the dataset into
five different sets; each will split the data into five folds. 20% of the total dataset one of the
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fold will represent the testing data, and the rest of the 80% will be the training data from
different sections of the original dataset.
After forming the k-fold sets, a number (k) of Neural network models will be created, each
being trained then tested with the different sets generated from the folds.
To summarize the training process, the original dataset processing will go through the
following steps:
1. Generate the dataset from Bearicade data and the anomaly data.
2. Randomly shuffles the dataset.
3. Generate k number of sets each with k number of folds.
4. Hold one of the k folds as a testing data.
5. Train the remaining folds from each set into a different model.
6. Evaluate the testing fold on the trained model.
7. Measure the k models performance from the training and testing data.
Model Configuration
Artificial Neural Network has a number of parameters that must be set when configuring
the neural network for training. Such parameters are called hyperparameters. These
parameters affect the network’s architecture and thus have an impact on the effectiveness
and performance of the Neural Network. Table 5.8 shows the different hyperparameters used
in the configuration of the final most optimal neural network build for this model.
As shown in table 5.7, the model has six main inputs, and thus the input size was set to 6.
As for the output layer, the prediction should include a percentage of safe and a percentage
of unsafe and thus, the output size was set to 2. Multiple configuration for the hidden
layer were tested and found that a 3 hidden layer first layer with 6 nodes to match the
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Cross Validation Folds 5
input layer, second was 4 nodes, and the third layer was set to 2 nodes to match the output
layer. Such configuration visualized in figure 5.8 were found to be the most optimal. The
Fig. 5.8 Neural Network model layers visualized
output values should be a value between 0 and 1 to represent a percentage; thus, one of the
most suitable activation functions to choose from would be the sigmoid/logistic function or
softmax function. Due to the limitation of Brain.js, the library used to build this model, and
only sigmoid could be used to build this network. The Binary Threshold is a value set in
order to help with the testing of the model. A 0.5 value indicate the midpoint between safe
and unsafe data. For this example, 0.5 indicated that any value larger than 50% would be
considered a 1 (100%) and any value lower or equal would be considered a 0 (0%).
As for the Error Threshold, which indicated the optimal low value of the error, iteration
would be stopped if reached. Although a 0.005 error was not reached in this model, a
0.006 value was reached; it allows the model to be further trained and may lower the error
percentage.
5.5 Model Per User For System 117
The learning rate indicates the frequency of the weights getting updated while training. The
learning rate had the most significant impact on this model’s accuracy; different values for
the learning rate have tested these values were between 0.5 and 0.0001. The test was done
by building the neural network model using the same dataset and the same order using these
different learning rate values (0.5, 0.1, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001, 0.0005, 0.0001). Graph 5.9, shows
the different learning rate values plotted to show the error values and the same number of
iteration.
Fig. 5.9 Different Learning Rate tested with error
As shown in table 5.9, the different learning rate along with the error values was ranked
from the most efficient and accurate to the least. The test showed that a learning rate value
between 0.01 and 0.0005 was the most optimal. Since the 0.01 learning rate value scored the
best regarding the error value, it was chosen for this model as an optimal value.
Finally, as for the cross-validation folds explained in Model Validation, five-folds were used
the most as it gives a good split between the training data and the testing data. However,
some users with lower datasets required higher folds as explained in Model Validation.
Table 5.9 Different Learning Rate tested ranks
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5.5.4 Evaluation
For every user, a unique model has to be created hence the model per user name. To evaluate
this neural network model, multiple models need to be trained with datasets from different
users.
Table 5.10 Users’ data summary used to evaluate the model
User Screens IP addresses Devices Days of Usage Total Logins
A 9 105 49 782 275
B 4 20 14 276 63
C 1 2 1 7 4
Table 5.10 shows the different users and count of their data that will be used in order to
evaluate the neural network model. The data represent 5 different values
1. Screens and IP addresses: the count of different screen resolutions and IP addresses
used to access Bearicade, respectively.
2. Devices: count of unique Operating systems, Platforms, and Browsers used to access
Bearicade.
3. Days of Usage: the number of days between first and last login.
4. Total Logins: the total number of successful authentication requests made to Bearicade.
The users chosen represent different use cases of the users. User A is the most active user
on Bearicade, with over 782 days of usage and 275 logins. User C is one of the least active
users; this user still has data that could be used to build a model. User B is a midpoint
and represent the users that have a short usage period on Bearicade with only seven days of
usage and four logins. The purpose of choosing these different users is to evaluate how the
model performs on these different usages and different dataset sizes.
All of the users’ models were trained using the same network hyperparameters explained
in the section above with 9600 iterations. The size of the genuine dataset is equal to the
number of total logins. Anomalies data were then appended to the dataset, the size of the
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anomalies data made equal to the number of total logins. For example, user A has 275 total
logins (genuine data); thus, another 275 anomalies data would be added to the data forming
dataset with 550 elements.
User A Model
User A dataset contained 550 data to be trained in the model. However, since the cross-
validation method was used with 5-folds, only 80% of the data (440) were trained in 5
different sets, and the other 20% (110) were used in testing the model. As User A has by far
the largest number of logins, the size of the dataset was adequate in training the model and
resulted in low error percentages for all five sets compared to the other users, as shown in
figure 5.11. As shown in figure 5.10, the average training error across the 5 different sets
was 0.009916 (0.99%). Some of the sets had misclassified some of the test data, but this is
acceptable as the anomalies test data may be completely new for the model.
Fig. 5.10 Cross Validation for User A model
User B Model
Using the same number of the fold as the User A model, this model was cross-validated.
User B dataset contained 126 elements split into 63 genuine and 63 anomalies. With only
23% the size of the dataset compared to the User A dataset, the model performed in an
acceptable manner with 0.017806 (1.78%) training error with some misclassified test data in
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Fig. 5.11 Evaluation for User A model
some sets. Figure 5.12 shows the cross-validation training error along with the iteration for
the five sets, figure 5.13 shows the error percentages along with the misclassified test counts
and train time for all five sets.
Fig. 5.12 Cross Validation for User B model
User C Model
Model for User C has the least training data with a size of 8. Thus, cross validation would
not work on such a small data set. However, the model was still trained without folds to
evaluate the training error for such a small dataset. As expected and shown in figure 5.14,
the model had a high training error percentage of 0.222 (22.2%).
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Fig. 5.13 Evaluation for User B model
Fig. 5.14 Training error for User C model
5.5.5 Conclusion
To illustrate the accuracy of trained models, three different types of users were chosen, each
with different dataset sizes. The model-per-user algorithm seems to give much better results
compared to the initial algorithm designs. However, since the algorithm depends on the
individual users’ data, it requires a large number of data to have a valid model.
It is expected that a typical Bearicade user would be required to use the system for at least
six months or have more than 60 successful logins to have enough data gathered about the
user in order for the model to learn the user’s behaviour and preferences.
To evaluate how these models perform in a real-world scenario, users A and B were asked to
log in to Bearicade after their independent model was trained. In addition to these logins, a
slight modification of the recent login data was modified to see how the model prediction
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works compared to the original login. Moreover, anomaly data were generated to evaluate
the model’s prediction.
Table 5.11 Real-world test for User A and User B models
User Test Expected Safe Prediction Unsafe Prediction
A Genuine Login Safe 99.181% 0.817%
A Genuine Login with modi-
fied Geo-Location
Unsafe 1.407% 98.592%
A Genuine Login with modi-
fied Device
Unsafe 1.406% 98.593%
A Anomaly Login Data Unsafe 1.407% 98.592%
B Genuine Login Safe 99.086% 0.915%
B Genuine Login with modi-
fied Geo-Location
Unsafe 2.956% 97.043%
B Genuine Login with modi-
fied Device
Unsafe 3.124% 96.876%
B Anomaly Login Data Unsafe 2.956% 97.043%
Table 5.11 above shows how both User A and User B models have matched the new test
data with the expected outcomes. With a high percentage of accuracy, the model could be
an optimal solution to predict the authenticity of the user attempting to login to Bearicade,
all from the data collected over time from the user.
5.6 Summary
This chapter presented a number of Machine Learning techniques developed to integrate into
the Bearicade framework. The Machine Learning models and data used to train and validate
the models applied for HPC security were presented. Three case studies were considered
addressing the security from the point of users’ behaviour such as the mouse movements and
the interactivity with the portal and more comprehensive model that includes not only the
user behaviour but also the environment variables based on the time, location and equipments
used by the users.
The results obtained are encouraging demonstrating high accuracy in detecting anomalies
and verifying users’ integrity.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
For most information technologies and computing networks, cyber protection is paramount.
High-performance computing is used in science studies, academia, and industry. HPC
technologies are designed to take advantage of HPC systems’ parallel architecture. Present
research into High-Performance Computing systems is focused on improvements in application
development, parallel algorithms, and computer system architecture. However, no significant
attempts have been made to establish universal security requirements for High-Performance
Computing. Security of High-Performance Computing infrastructure is often an afterthought
of various administrative strategies that do not satisfy additional High-Performance Comput-
ing security requirements.
In the past, security breaches affecting HPC centres were relatively rare. However, recently
the HPC system components’ vulnerabilities are on the rise. Furthermore, the incentives
for attacking HPC resources are increasing in value due to the substantial computational
power, high bandwidth networks, and massive storage. For example, in the past, four years
ago at the University of Huddersfield QueensGate Grid, there were, on average, 50,000
malicious login attempts that occur on a daily basis. As a result, increasing the protection
of HPC systems is a necessity. According to a recent presentations by the experts from the
UK Hight-Performance Computing Community, during the meeting of the HPC-SIG group,
124 Conclusion
there is no widely agreed security mechanism for the HPC systems of the HPC-SIG Group.
The new security architectures for High-Performance Computing systems are proprietary,
unreleased institutional solutions.
A comprehensive literature review of the existing access solutions for HPC systems revealed
that although advancements are made towards HPC portal solutions, such solutions lack
required basic security requirement implementations. Furthermore, the limited published
security solutions for HPC have not been integrated into existing access solutions. Moreover,
the current non-portal primitive access solutions use insufficient security practices in many
HPC centres, causing attacks similar to the summer 2020 attack that targeted HPC centres
in the United Kingdom.
The majority of cyber-attacks have a life span. Every stage of its growth can produce
indicators that are difficult to detect by security professionals and system administrators
using the conventional HPC solutions. As a result, it was essential to improve SIEM/SOAR
systems. SIEM/SOAR systems provide a way to visualise and capture data and incidents
in most system components, providing system administrators with a large volume of data
to analyse. Because of the advancements in these systems, security administrators are
inundated with data, much of which is noise, making attackers’ mission easier. There is
a need for SIEM/SOAR systems to be developed specifically for the HPC environment.
Integrating artificial intelligent technologies in the SIEM/SOAR systems could vastly help
system administrators in monitoring HPC systems activities. Data generated from HPC
centres and their users is unique and differs from typical computer systems infrastructures.
Therefore, the data generated from the HPC security system can be used to train artificial
intelligence models for autonomous detection.
The aim of this research was to create a novel data-driven secure access framework for
HPC systems that combines the capabilities of the Security Orchestration Automation and
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Response System (SOAR) and Security Information and Event Management System (SIEM).
The framework will allow further development of Artificial intelligent algorithms designed for
anomaly detection in access and usage of HPC systems. To achieve the aim, (i) thorough
research needed to be conducted to investigate the current challenges and solutions within
HPC. (ii) it was necessary to design, develop and deploy the framework in the University of
Huddersfield Campus Grid for management of HPC resources and users. (iii) analyse the
data collected and accelerate the framework’s security by building machine learning models
for autonomous anomaly detection. (iv) evaluate the effectiveness of the framework.
As a result of the efforts outlined above, Bearicade was introduced. Bearicade is an HPC
users and security management gateway; it is built based on an architecture that allows users
to access several nodes on/off-premise remotely and includes a web terminal and file manager
implementation. Bearicade is built on well-known browser features, and it allows for safe
operation and access to HPC systems without requiring specialised user training. System
security is accomplished by continuously tracking, analysing, and interpreting data, such as
user interaction, server requests, access devices, and geographic locations, among other things.
Anomalies in users’ actions would be noticeable to server administrators, allowing them to
take quick action to mitigate risks. In addition, the system does not use SSH as its primary
remote access portal. Instead, the online dashboard serves as a portal. Bearicade, which is
based on a RESTful API, helps administrators and developers visualise and analyse activities
over the systems, allowing machine learning deployment to aid in enhancing systems security
based on the data gathered.
Bearicade was deployed at the QueensGate Grid at the University of Huddersfield. Users
used Bearicade as their only access to HPC services, and administrators monitored their
systems and users from within Bearicade. This has helped Bearicade to demonstrate its
versatility and make data collection from various sources easier inside Bearicade, allowing for
the extension of security systems by Artificial Intelligence.
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As part of this study, Bearicade is a data-driven architecture that was designed, developed,
and implemented. Bearicade captures all of its users’ data from dashboard components
through the users’ interactions. Bearicade’s dashboard serves as a portal to the HPC systems.
Furthermore, Bearicade authorises and records any interaction with these systems. An
artificial intelligence system could be used with Bearicade in data analysis and internal data
inventory. It can help to make decisions at any point during a user’s interactions with a
device to identify and respond to irregularities and improve detection accuracy.
Since the creation of Bearicade and the development of Machine learning algorithms, many
efforts have been made over the last four years to create a generation of models that detect
anomalies in the system. Many iterations of these models have contributed to the novel
successful working models.
Various Machine Learning models were developed, each of the models serves as a use-case
study. Three Machine Learning models were built. The first model was trained based on
the perspective of user behaviour, such as mouse movements and dashboard interactivity.
Second model identified malicious user commands before being sent to the target system.
Finally, a detailed model used user behaviour and environmental variables dependent on
time, place, and equipment used by users to train Artificial Neural Network models to detect
anomalies in users’ access to the HPC systems. Various tests were run on the QGG grid
HPC tools to test the Bearicade framework’s success in standard scenarios related to safe
access to HPC systems. The findings are promising, showing high precision in identifying
irregularities and checking the credibility of users, also opening up potential development for
other Artificial Intelligent algorithms.
The novelty of the Bearicade framework is demonstrated in the framework’s architecture
and Machine Learning models developed through Bearicade. This ability that has not been
previously available for conventional access methods in HPC and the uniqueness of the
work discussed in this study. Bearicade is not just a prototype; it is a production system
and effective solutions for authentication authorisation. This claim is proven by its four
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years of active duty as the exclusive access software for the QueensGate Grid’s users and
administrators at the University of Huddersfield.
Addressing Research Questions
Following the extensive literature review conducted, there were some research questions
identified. It is necessary to confirm the efficacy of the proposed framework (Bearicade) and
the complementary Artificial Intelligent Machine Learning models developed. This section
will address each of the research questions.
How can the technologies and data provided by this research contribute to the
development and implementation of automated security access system in HPC?
The development and four-year deployment of Bearicade at QGG have allowed this system’s
usage as the primary access system for QGG users. The system’s architecture has enabled
the system to gather various information from its users forming a large dataset that was then
used to build and implement multiple Machine Learning models serving as an automated
anomaly detection over different components of the system.
To what extent such an implementation can protect HPC systems and authorised
access?
Bearicade follows the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard and contains
multiple security features that many other competitive systems lack; this is essential for a
secure authentication and authorisation system access mechanism. In addition, the evaluation
of the developed Machine Learning models has proven the models’ capabilities in identifying
anomalies in users’ physical behaviour actions throughout the users’ interaction with the
system.
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Will such implementation help in the Management and the usability of HPC
systems?
Bearicade is currently used as the primary access gateway for QGG users, and the system has
demonstrated that it can provide a smooth and automated operation in regards to the users’
registration, authentication and user and job management. Also, the system has eliminated
the need for users to have knowledge in Bash, that the SSH access method required. Finally,
according to a conducted System Usability Score survey, Bearicade has a better usability
and user satisfaction compared to traditional SSH.
Limitation
Bearicade has provided an efficient solution to a current problem and has contributed to the
gap of knowledge. However, some limitations should be noted:
1. Bearicade’s codebase is very large and requires continuous testing for any vulnerabilities
that may be caused by one the component of the framework.
2. Since Bearicade’s front-end is based on web technologies which is currently evolv-
ing rapidly, the system will require to be updated regularly to achieve cross-device
compatibility and secure state.
3. Bearicade works well with Red-hat Enterprise based Linux operating systems. However,
Bearicade was not tested on other operating systems such as Debian.
4. Although Bearicade has the basic functional features as a HPC system, it will require
further development of add-ons to be able to replace the more advanced HPC-focused
portals and improve the users’ experience.
5. As with most Machine Learning models, some of Bearicade’s models require a large
dataset in order to achieve a reliable anomaly detection accuracy. In addition, Machine
Learning models may introduce false positives/negatives.
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Future Work
The work presented in this thesis, including Bearicade codebase and some of the Machine
Learning models, has been published and is freely available to the community as open-source
projects. Continuous monitoring of the system components will be carried and the project will
be update accordingly to keep the system at a reliable and secure state. Bearicade has been
implemented and tested extensively at tier 3 HPC systems (QGG). Additional efforts will be
made to ensure the framework’s compatibility with a wider range of HPC systems configu-
rations and environments. This will allow the framework to be deployed at other HPC centres.
Further Bearicade add-ons will be developed to guarantee the framework’s adequacy in
replacing more advanced HPC-focused portals and better user’s usability of the dashboard.
Moreover, additional Artificial Intelligent tools and Machine Learning models will be explored
to enable better anomaly detection accuracy and cover more system components to be tested
for anomalies.
Future publications, currently in preparation, will further expand some of the work presented
in this thesis. Our published journal article is exploring some of the work done in this
thesis, and journal article is currently under review, with two more publications in progress
extending the work presented in the PhD thesis.
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Publications
Al-Jody, T., Holmes, V., Antoniades, A., & Kazkouzeh, Y.: Bearicade: secure access gateway
to High Performance Computing systems. In The 19th IEEE International Conference on
Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications 2020.
Abstract: “Cyber security is becoming a vital part of many information technologies and
computing systems. Increasingly, High-Performance Computing systems are used in scientific
research, academia and industry. High-Performance Computing applications are specifically
designed to take advantage of the parallel nature of High-Performance Computing systems.
Current research into High-Performance Computing systems focuses on the improvements
in software development, parallel algorithms and computer systems architecture. However,
there are no significant efforts in developing common High-Performance Computing security
standards. Security of the High-Performance Computing resources is often an add-on to
existing varied institutional policies that do not take into account additional requirements
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for High-Performance Computing security. Also, the users’ terminals or portals used to
access the High-Performance Computing resources are frequently insecure or they are being
used in unprotected networks. In this paper we present Bearicade - a Data-driven Security
Orchestration Automation and Response system. Bearicade collects data from the HPC
systems and its users, enabling the use of Machine Learning based solutions to address current
security issues in the High-Performance Computing systems. The system security is achieved
through monitoring, analysis and interpretation of data such as users’ activity, server requests,
devices used and geographic locations. Any anomaly in users’ behaviour is detected using
machine learning algorithms, and would be visible to system administrators to help mediate
the threats. The system was tested on a university campus grid system by administrators
and users. Two case studies, Anomaly detection of user behaviour and Classification of
Malicious Linux Terminal Command, have demonstrated machine learning approaches in
identifying potential security threats. Bearicade’s data was used in the experiments. The
results demonstrated that detailed information is provided to the HPC administrators to detect
possible security attacks and to act promptly.”
Higgins, J, Al-Jody, T, Aagela, H., Holmes, V.: “Inspiring the Next Generation of HPC
Engineers with Re-configurable, Multi-Tenant Resources for Teaching and Research”, Under
Review.
Abstract: “There is a tradition at our university for teaching and research in High Perfor-
mance Computing (HPC) systems engineering. With exascale computing on the horizon, and
a shortage of HPC talent, there is a need for new research computing specialists to secure the
future of research computing. Whilst many institutions provide research computing training
for users within their particular domain, few offer HPC engineering and infrastructure related
courses, making it difficult for students to acquire these skills. This paper outlines how and
why we are training students in HPC systems engineering skills, including technologies used
in delivering this goal. We demonstrate a potential for a multi-tenant system for education
and research which can be supported by other institutions, using novel container and cloud
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based architecture. An evaluation of our activities over the last 2 years is given in terms of
recruitment metrics, skills audit feedback from students, and research outputs enabled by the
multi-tenant usage of the resource.”.
Higgins, J., Al-Jody, T. & Holmes, V.: “Rapid Deployment of Bare-Metal and In-Container
HPC clusters using OpenHPC playbooks”, HPC Systems Professionals Workshop, held in
conjunction with SuperComputing 2018.
Abstract: “In this paper, we present a toolbox of reusable Ansible roles and playbooks in
order to configure a cluster software environment described by the freely available OpenHPC
recipes. They can be composed in order to deploy a robust and reliable cluster environment,
instilled with the best practise offered by the OpenHPC packaging, and the repeatability and
integrity guarantees of the configuration managed approach. With container virtualization
setting a new trend in scientific software management, we focus this effort on supporting the
deployment of such environments on both bare-metal and container-based targets using the
Virtual Container Cluster framework.“
Aagela, H., Al-Jody, T., Holmes, V.: “Web-based Wireless Wake-on-LAN approach for
Robots.”, IEEE, ICAC 2018.
Abstract: “The ability to remotely wake-up robots over a wireless LAN can improve the
performance and the power consumption of remote robots or cloud robotics system. This
paper presents a solution for power management of a mobile robot, using web-based wireless
Wake-on-LAN (WWoL). The focus in on power management of a mobile robot, but this
approach is also suitable for most of the IoT mobile devices, and other systems that are
designed to be used remotely. The proposed solution allows the targeted device to be powered
ON and OFF remotely via a web-based dashboard. This approach is validated in a case study
with an AR. Drone 2.0. and demonstrated substantial power optimisation for the drone. In
addition, security issues are explored when WWoL is deployed in remote control of mobile
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devices. It was established that a power consumption is reduced when the drone is in a
standby mode waiting for an operator to send a wake-on request message wirelessly, without
compromising security posed by wireless remote access to the devices”.
Matani, A., Al-Jody, T. & Benson, D.: “Pilot Investigating the Correlation between At-
tainment and Attendance using Statistics, Neural Networking and Artificial Intelligence”,
JALTIE Journal 2019.
Abstract: “This paper describes a new approach in quantitatively predicting students’
performance using Artificial Intelligence and Neural Networks (AI&NN) systems. The
purpose of the study is to investigate the suitability of these systems to accurately predict
students’ attainment, from us- ing factors of attendance and pre-entry English scores. One-
year’s worth of anonymous data of yearly attendance percentages, past pre-entry English
scores, and actual attainment was used from 2017-18 published annual evaluation reports
data-set and attendance records for Hudders- field International Study Centre, UK. The study
used this data to train the AI&NN system, and the latter, in turn, learnt to predict attainment
of similar arbitrary data. The AI&NN system also succeeded in quantitatively predicting, after
it learnt from the real data, the significant influence of attendance on attainment compared to
the influence of the other factors used. This method is chosen over other methods (Costa et
al., 2017; Kumar et al., 2017) because it is powerful; its outcome is fast and scalable. The
study’s encouraging results show that, if trained with the right amount of data and used in the
right context, similar systems will have the potential to be used to predict many other desired
outcomes that will have a great impact on improving the quality of education.“
Al-Jody, T., Holmes, V.: “Security Orchestration Automation and Response (SOAR) in High
Performance Computing Systems”, Emerging Technology Conference 2019.
Abstract: “Cybersecurity is becoming critical for many information and computing systems.
In addition to standard security issues, there are additional requirements for secure access
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to High-Performance Computing (HPC) systems. The user management of HPC systems
is often an add-on to existing institutional policies that do not take into account the need
to access many different HPC systems. There are no common HPC security standards in
research and education communities. Every institution has its own policy, often certified by the
e-science certificate authority (CA). Because the HPC systems are often behind institutional
firewalls, most registered users use Simply Secure Shell (SSH) to access given HPC resource.
The institutions often hold training events to educate the users on how to access their HPC
resources. This is sometimes perceived as a barrier to entry to HPC. However, the systems
used to access HPC clusters are frequently insecure, such as Putty, or they are being used in
unprotected networks. Currently, many HPC centres make use of Private Key Infrastructure
(PKI) as a basic method of authentication. This method has proven reliability. However,
even with the PKI authentication in place, there are potentially security issues for users
who have minimal security awareness. In this paper we present a Security Orchestration
Automation and Response (SOAR) system which will address current security issues in HPC
systems. It is based on familiar browser elements and supports secure operation and access
to HPC systems without a need for specialist user training. The architecture of the systems
is shown in figure 1. The user registration and authorisation is based on the two-factor
authentication, via either the time-based one-time password or universal second factor (U2F).
The system security is achieved through monitoring, analysis and interpretation of data
such as continuous supervision of users’ activity, server requests, devices and geographic
locations, etc. Any anomaly in users’ behavior would be visible to system administrators
and will facilitate prompt actions in order to mediate the threats. The system was tested on
Queens Gate Grid (QGG) system by administrators and student users at the University of
Huddersfield. Initial administrator and user feedback is encouraging. From an administrative
perspective, detailed information is available to detect possible security threats and to act
promptly. From the users’ perspective, the system is easy to learn and use. It provides
repeatedly reliable access to resources, submitting and running jobs, and managing files.“
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Open Source Projects
Bearicade: “Bearicade is an MIT-licensed open-source data-driven secure gateway for
distributed system, build on a REST API, containerized via Docker and deployable with
Ansible.“
Github Repository | Website
Web-User-Behaviour: “Configurable and Lightweight JS Library for user behaviour tracking
from the browser, using mouse movements, clicks, scroll, and time on page.“
Github Repository
Inception: “Inception is a toolkit that brings together the best modern technologies in order
to create fast and flexible turn-key HPC environments, deployable on bare-metal infrastructure




The System Usability Scale (SUS) surveys issued to the students as explained in 4.5 are
shown in figures B.1 and B.2 respectively.
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Please enter your student number: U_____
System Usability Scale (SUS)
This is a standard questionnaire that measures the overall usability of a system that you have 
built in term 1. Please select the answer that best expresses how you feel about each statement 









1. I think I would like to use 
this tool frequently. 
    
2. I found the tool 
unnecessarily complex.
    
3. I thought the tool was 
easy to use.
    
4. I think that I would need 
the support of a technical 
person to be able to use 
this system.
    
5. I found the various 
functions in this tool were 
well integrated.
    
6. I thought there was too 
much inconsistency in this 
tool.
    
7. I would imagine that most 
people would learn to use 
this tool very quickly.
    
8. I found the tool very 
cumbersome to use.
    
9. I felt very confident using 
the tool.
    
10. I needed to learn a lot of 
things before I could get 
going with this tool.
    
How likely are you to recommend this cluster to others? (please circle your answer)
Not at all likely    0         1         2         3          4          5          6          7          8           9          10    Extremely likely  
Fig. B.1 In-class SUS Survey for SSH access method
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Ques!on 1 (Mandatory)
I think that I would like to use this website frequently.
Ques!on 2 (Mandatory)
I found this website unnecessarily complex.
Ques!on 3 (Mandatory)
I thought this website was easy to use
Ques!on 4 (Mandatory)
I think that I would need assistance to be able to use this website.
Ques!on 5 (Mandatory)
I found the various func!ons in this website were well integrated.
Ques!on 6 (Mandatory)
I thought there was too much inconsistency in this website.
Ques!on 7 (Mandatory)
I would imagine that most people would learn to use this website very quickly.
Ques!on 8 (Mandatory)
I found this website very cumbersome/awkward to use.
Ques!on 9 (Mandatory)
I felt very confident using this website
Ques!on 10 (Mandatory)
I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this website.
Ques!on 11
Feedback or comments (op!onal)
Compared to the first survey you have done about your experience in building the cluster, this survey is about the new Dashboard that
you have used.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Fig. B.2 Online SUS Survey for SSH access method

Appendix C
System Usability Scale (SUS) Results
The System Usability Scale (SUS) results explained in 4.5 are shown in Tables C.1 and C.2
for the SSH and Bearicade access method respectively.
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Table C.1 System Usability Scale Results for SSH
Participant q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9 q10 SUS Score
1 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 2 60.0
2 4 3 4 5 5 2 4 3 5 2 67.5
3 3 1 3 5 3 2 4 3 5 3 60.0
4 3 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 4 47.5
5 4 3 2 5 4 2 2 3 3 4 45.0
6 5 2 5 4 3 3 5 3 5 4 67.5
7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 50.0
8 2 3 4 4 4 2 3 1 3 2 60.0
9 2 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 3 5 37.5
10 4 4 2 3 3 2 2 4 3 5 40.0
11 4 4 3 5 5 5 3 4 3 3 42.5
12 3 4 2 4 4 3 2 3 2 4 37.5
13 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 45.0
14 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 45.0
15 3 3 3 4 4 2 4 3 2 4 50.0
16 2 3 2 2 2 4 2 1 3 3 45.0
17 3 2 4 1 4 1 5 4 4 1 77.5
18 4 2 5 2 4 2 5 5 5 3 72.5
19 5 2 5 2 5 1 5 2 5 3 87.5
20 5 1 3 2 5 3 5 5 5 2 75.0
21 3 2 4 3 5 2 5 3 4 3 70.0
22 1 5 1 5 4 4 2 3 2 5 20.0
23 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 52.5
24 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 50.0
25 5 4 4 4 5 1 2 1 4 4 65.0
26 3 2 3 2 4 4 3 3 3 4 52.5
27 4 3 3 2 4 4 2 2 3 2 57.5
28 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 3 4 2 65.0
29 4 2 3 4 4 3 4 2 4 4 60.0
30 2 2 4 3 5 4 2 2 3 2 57.5
31 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 47.5
32 1 2 5 4 4 2 4 3 3 3 57.5
33 4 3 3 2 2 3 4 3 4 4 55.0
34 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 50.0
35 3 1 4 3 4 2 4 2 3 5 62.5
36 2 4 3 5 3 3 2 3 1 5 27.5
37 2 3 2 5 3 4 1 1 1 5 27.5
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Table C.2 System Usability Scale Results for Bearicade
Participant q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9 q10 SUS Score
1 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 47.5
2 5 2 5 2 5 1 4 2 5 3 85.0
3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 52.5
4 5 2 2 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 55.0
5 5 2 5 2 5 1 5 1 5 2 92.5
6 5 5 5 5 5 2 3 2 4 4 60.0
7 4 3 3 4 5 2 5 3 4 4 62.5
8 3 4 3 2 2 3 4 3 3 4 47.5
9 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 50.0
10 4 2 4 1 3 1 3 1 3 3 72.5
11 4 2 3 2 4 2 5 1 5 2 80.0
12 5 3 5 4 4 3 3 2 3 3 62.5

Appendix D
Bearicade: Summary and Source
Code
Information about the source code and list of features for Bearicade could be found on the
Website or the Github repository page:
Website https://bearicade.ta3.dev
Source Code https://github.com/TA3/bearicade
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Fig. D.1 Some Features of Bearicade - Bearicade Website (Al-Jody, 2018)
159
Fig. D.2 Summary of Bearicade - Bearicade Github Repository (Al-Jody, 2017)
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Fig. D.3 Prerequisite and Deployment Procedure - Bearicade Github Repository (Al-Jody,
2017)
